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Divorce has been and remains a prevalent occurrence in the United States and,
while rates are not increasing as they once were, it still remains an extremely common
phenomenon. As of the most recent U.S. Census Bureau report on divorce and
remarriage, 56% of men and 59% of women ever married have been divorced. Despite
these statistics, the vast majority of Americans still value marriage as an institution. This
study aims to examine the role religion plays in the propensity and timing of remarriage.
Using logistic and OLS regressions, and data pooled from the 1995 and 2002 National
Survey of Family Growth, multifaceted effects of denominational subcultures are
examined concerning the propensity and timing of remarriage among divorced women. In
addition, the linkages between religious salience, religious attendance, and the propensity
and timing of remarriage are explored.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Divorce has been and remains a prevalent occurrence in the United States and,
while rates are not increasing as they once were, it still remains an extremely common
phenomenon. As of the most recent U.S. Census Bureau report on divorce and
remarriage, 56% of men and 59% of women ever married have been divorced.
Additionally, 12.5% of men and 13.6% of women ever married have divorced and
remarried once (Census 2001). The Census also reports that the average age of first
divorce for men is 31.5 and 29.4 for women, and the duration of time between divorce
and first remarriage is 3.3 years for men and 3.5 years for women. In fact, trends suggest
that remarriage has become as common as first marriage in America (Bumpass, Sweet
and Martin 1990). Unfortunately, to date, remarriage receives much less scholarly
attention than first marriage and little, if any, research effort has been made to investigate
the religious subcultural variations in the propensity and timing of remarriage. This
research paucity is regrettable because prior research has shown consistent and
significant denominational variations in the propensity and timing of first marriage.
Using survey data from a nationally representative sample, Xu, Hudspeth and Bartkowski
(2005) reported that while Catholics, moderate Protestants, conservative Protestants and
Mormons are more likely to marry and marry significantly earlier than those who are
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unaffiliated, Jews tend to marry later than Catholics, conservative Protestants and
Mormons.
In light of these research findings, which support the denominational subcultural
paradigm in the case of propensity and timing of first marriage, there is an urgent need
for similar research to be conducted on remarriage. This study is designed to fill this
research void. In addition to denominational subcultural variations, religious salience
and worship service attendance will also be considered given that past research typically
excluded them. Thus, the goal of this study is to further understand how religion and
remarriage – two important social institutions – are interrelated and how the interlocking
linkages manifest themselves in the propensity and timing of remarriage.
Using two waves of the National Survey of Family Growth, this study will
attempt to answer the following research questions. Does religion influence the
propensity and timing of remarriage? If so, are there denominational variations as
previously reported concerning first marriage? Are these denominational variations, if
they exist, robust after religious salience and worship service attendance are taken into
consideration? Irrespective of denominational affiliation and their respective subcultural
variations, does religious salience promote remarriage? And, what role, if any, does
worship service attendance play in remarriage?
This research is important for several reasons. First, given the primacy and
centrality various religious groups or subgroups have placed on marriage (Lehrer 2004a,
2004b; Xu, Hudspeth and Bartkowski 2005), it is imperative to understand how these
groups have responded to persistently high divorce rates. More importantly, it is
essential to learn how these religious groups have accommodated themselves to new life
2

course transitions, such as remarriage, which may have been frequently encountered by
their adherents. Though previous research has documented large denominational
subcultural variations in divorce rates, we know almost nothing about denominational
subcultural views and behaviors with regard to remarriage.
Secondly, this research can shed illuminating light on divergent/convergent
pathways to re-partnering among various religious groups in terms of the propensity and
timing of second union. These critical issues have moved to the forefront of social
science research in recent years not only in North America but also in Europe (Wu 2005;
DeGraaf and Kalmijn 2003). However, to the best of my knowledge, no scholarly
attention has been given to the role of religion in this increasingly important life course
transition, namely, remarriage.
Last but not least, this study can deepen our understanding of the recent “family
wars” and “marriage debate” stemming from the increased concerns about the wellbeing
of marriage and family life in the United States. Since the 1960’s, there has been
considerable debate regarding whether or not the United States has been experiencing a
decline in the institution of marriage or the deinstitutionalization of American marriage
(Cherlin 2004; Popenoe 1993). According to Popenoe, the nuclear family, as a social
institution, is witnessing a dramatic decline. The most notable change, Popenoe suggests,
has been the change in marital roles associated with the “traditional nuclear family.”
There are more women in the workplace, delaying marriage and decreasing the birthrate.
He argues that, “Traditionally marriage has been understood as a social obligation – an
institution designed mainly for economic security and procreation”, whereas “marriage
today is a voluntary relationship that individuals can make and break at will,” depending
3

upon their own “self fulfillment” (Popenoe 1993:533). In other words, according to
Cherlin and Popenoe, marriage is increasingly becoming deinstitutionalized.
However, it is argued by other social scientists that the institutions of marriage
and the family are not declining but merely changing. Stacey (1993), for example, claims
that the family is not an institution, but an “ideological, symbolic construct that has a
history and politics” (p. 545). Instead of arguing that the “Ozzie and Harriet” form of the
family (heterosexual, conjugal, nuclear domestic unit, ideally one with a male primary
breadwinner, a female primary homemaker and their dependent offspring) has dissolved,
she calls for an appreciation of the new and more diverse domestic ideology (“the
postmodern family condition.”). Stacey acknowledges that the woman’s ability to
maintain herself outside of marriage has contributed to increased divorced rates and more
single parent families. However, she believes that the increased autonomy of women is
important and that the family as a social construct is not disappearing as Popenoe would
have us believe (also see Stacey 1998).
In response to Popenoe and Stacey, Norval D. Glenn (1993) makes a more
“objective assessment of the notion of family decline” (p. 542). He explains that
Popenoe’s account of family decline is correct and empirically supported to receive
consideration. He insists that the criticism it has received from social scientists or
feminists is merely liberals responding to an issue associated with conservatism.
Religious conservatives are seen as being unsupportive of women working outside the
home. They feel that the woman’s place is in the home taking care of her husband and
children, which discourages women from pursuing careers and encourages them to marry
early and begin having children. Therefore, social scientists and feminists criticize
4

conservatives suggesting that they are trying to hold women back. Glenn asserts that
there is no evidence of a causal link between the status of women and recent family
changes. He contends that while increased labor force participation among women has
increased the “independence effect,” their working outside the home is only one of
several reasons for the increase in divorce. “Therefore, it is unlikely that married women
must retreat from the labor force in order for marriages to become more stable and for the
probability of marital success to increase.” (Glenn 1993:544). Divorce rates and the
number of single parent families continue to rise, and this debate wages on. With these
diverse views in mind, the current research can shed further light on this continued debate
on marriage and family life in contemporary American society.
To examine the previously developed research questions, two analytical
techniques will be used. First, logistic regression will be used to examine the propensity
of remarriage among different religious groups including those who are unaffiliated.
Secondly, ordinary least squares (OLS) regression will be used to examine the waiting
time following divorce before remarrying by religious groups. In addition, regression
models will be estimated to examine how religious salience and worship service
attendance are related to the propensity and timing of remarriage, while controlling for
denominational affiliation and the selected demographic variables.

5

CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW

Theoretical Framework
This study utilizes Christian Smith’s (1998) subcultural identity theory of
religious strength as a guiding framework. Smith developed this theory of religious
strength in response to rapid social changes in the modern world, and highlighted the
profound cultural complexities that have emerged within conservative Protestantism.
This theoretical framework suggests that in a pluralistic society, such as the U.S., various
religious organizations can survive and thrive by the coupling of distinction (i.e.,
separating themselves from other groups) and engagement (i.e., adapting to the changing
sociocultural environment). This means that, according to Smith, various religious
organizations can obtain their respective subcultural identities by distinguishing
themselves from others and by strengthening their intra-group solidarity, resource
mobilization, and membership retention. As a result, religious subcultural uniqueness
and identity have become cornerstones that underlie and promote the remarkable growth
of religious pluralism.
Smith contends that confronted with enormous and rapid social changes, religious
organizations are capable of making adaptations and accommodations. However, he
forcefully argues that
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“Many accommodation interpretations tend to assume, wrongly, that religion and
modernity are playing a zero-sum game: that religious groups have a fixed
number of orthodox ‘goods’ to try to protect, which are gradually depleted
through accommodation. The truth is, religious actors are quite capable of
reclaiming and reinvigorating lost and dormant sacred themes, traditions and
practices; of generating new religious goods while relinquishing others; and of
using quintessentially modern tools to strengthen and promote their traditional
worldviews and ways of life. In assessing contemporary religious change, then,
we need not choose between a static view of historical orthodoxy and a vacuous
religious relativism. The alternative and preferred choice is that which reflects
the way most traditional religious groups actually operate in history in the real
world: they work fairly successfully to sustain relatively stable distinctive
religious identity while ever reformulating it to engage the conditions of the
times” (Smith 1998: 100).
Consequently, while engaging in the ever-changing society, some Protestant
organizations have become less or more accommodating than others. For example,
traditional (fundamentalist) Protestantism is particularly distinctive because of its
unwavering biblical literalism, which is less tolerant of new lifestyles and life course
transitions characteristic of modern society, such as divorce and remarriage. On the other
hand, in an attempt to retain membership, some Protestant organizations have made
appropriate accommodations to such changes. By applying this argument to the longstanding linkages between religion and family life, it is argued that there ought to be
striking religious subcultural variations in such important social and family issues as
marriage, divorce, remarriage, fertility, and gender ideologies.
Smith traces evangelicalism throughout history, from the height of its dominance
in the 19th century to its decline at the hands of several factors, including “the rise of
liberal theology, the secularization of academic institutions and the urbanization of rural
America” (Magee 1999: 1). According to Smith, mainstream evangelicals responded to
this decline in a few different ways. Some joined the liberal movement, others chose to
7

“ride out the storm,” but a large portion “became the fundamentalist backlash within the
American church” (Magee 1999: 1). By the early to mid 20th century, a group of young
fundamentalists, led by Billy Graham, chose to revive evangelicalism, which emphasized
unity, reflecting the times and mirroring the ecumenical movements of moderate and
liberal Christian groups. Most significantly, however, the new group began a movement
that could be distinguished as evangelical and that was separate from conservative
fundamentalism (Magee 1999: 1).
Formulated from a series of propositions, Smith derives what he terms a
“subcultural identity theory of religious strength.” Smith believes that humans have a
drive to belong and it is only by being located within social groups that humans satisfy
this drive and come to develop an identity. These social groups, then, separate
themselves from other groups by creating distinctions between themselves and others,
which must constantly be renegotiated to accommodate the changing sociocultural
environment. Consequently, individuals define themselves and their norms and values in
relation to other dissimilar groups that “may serve as negative reference groups” (Smith
1998: 104). Modernization, according to Smith, promotes the formation of these strong
subcultures and “potentially ‘deviant’ identities, including religious subcultures and
identities” (Smith 1998: 107). Smith asserts that if conflict arises between these groups,
it only serves to strengthen in-group solidarity. Therefore, “Modernity can actually
increase religion’s appeal, by creating social conditions, which intensify the kinds of felt
needs and desires that religion is especially well-positioned to satisfy” (Smith 1998: 116).
From these propositions, Smith derives his subcultural identity theory of religion in
which he states that, instead of religion being hindered by a pluralistic modern society, it
8

“survives and thrives” by religious groups’ ability to distinguish themselves from other
groups and provide “meaning and belonging” to its members (Smith 1998: 118-119).
Also from these propositions, he derives his subcultural theory of religious strength,
which suggests that those religious groups that are most distinctive will be the strongest
and most dominant.
Based on Smith’s theory of religious subcultures, engagement and
accommodation, this study explores religious subcultural variations in remarriage. As
Smith contends, in a pluralistic society, religious groups can distinguish themselves by
creating distinctive norms and values that fit into their belief system. These norms and
values, in turn, affect many of the day-to-day activities of the individuals belonging to
these religious subcultures, including their beliefs regarding marriage, divorce and, more
pointedly for this study, remarriage. Indeed, research has shown that “with regard to profamily attitudes, religious groups can be arrayed on a continuum from conservative (e.g.,
Southern Baptist, other evangelical or fundamentalist), to moderate (e.g., Catholic,
Lutheran, Methodist), to liberal (e.g., Episcopal, Reformed Jewish faith tradition), with
non-affiliates reporting the most liberal attitudes of all.” (Gay 1996:4). In support of this
religious subcultural variation thesis, Gay et al. reported that more conservative religious
groups do hold more traditional views regarding family and gender related issues,
whereas more liberal religious groups exhibit less traditional values regarding these same
issues (Gay et al. 1996). However, it should be noted that there is considerable intragroup diversity within each of these religious subcultures. Guided by this theoretical
framework and empirical evidence, I examine the multifaceted linkages between various
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religious groups, religious salience, worship service attendance and remarriage in
contemporary U.S. society.

Religion and Marriage
“Despite social scientists’ predictions of a decline in the importance of religion
and its role in U.S. society, interest in issues related to spirituality and religion has grown
significantly in recent years” (Wallace, Forman, Caldwell and Willis 2003:98). This is
evident from the fact that about 60% of Americans report being affiliated with a religious
organization and about 45% report that they regularly attend religious services at least
monthly (Waite and Lehrer 2003). Belief in religious teachings and personal spirituality
are also important factors in a person’s religious experience (Call and Heaton 1997).
Similarly, most adult Americans are married or will marry at some point in their lives
(Waite and Lehrer 2003). Clearly, both religion and marriage are important social
institutions in the United States and it is not surprising that they have a significant impact
on one another. Marriage also remains an important social institution, despite evidence
to the contrary.
According to Huston and Melz (2004), the context of the family has shifted in
recent decades in four very important ways: (1) increased nonmarital cohabitation; (2)
increased out-of-wedlock births; (3) delayed marriage and (4) increased divorce rates.
Therefore, in comparison to the 1950s, adults in the United States spend a much smaller
proportion of their lives being married, and those adults not married are much more likely
to enter into non-traditional family relationships. However, Americans still report that
they want to be married and believe that being married is an indicator of a “good life”.
10

Similarly, according to Waite and Leher (2003), most adult Americans are married or
will marry at some point in their lives. Huston and Melz argue that this is because
marriage is no longer required for “reproduction and the gendered division of labor,” as it
was in previous decades. Marriage, then, is still highly valued but there has been a
“fundamental transformation” in the meaning that is placed on marriage. Clearly, both
religion and marriage are important social institutions in the United States and it is not
surprising that they have a significant impact on one another.
In the following review, I examine the views and behaviors concerning marriage,
divorce and remarriage and how they vary across religious groups. For the purpose of
this discussion, I have combined the different religious groups under the headings of
conservative Protestants (Baptist/ Southern Baptist, and Fundamentalist Protestant),
mainline Protestants (Methodists, Lutheran and Episcopal), other Protestants (Mormon
and other unspecified Protestant denominations), other faith traditions (Jewish, Muslim
and Buddhist), Catholics and nonaffiliates (see Steensland et al. 2000). I also review
empirical research that has investigated the relationship between religious salience,
worship service attendance, and marriage, divorce, and remarriage. In addition, I pay
special attention to several important sociodemographic variables to understand what
effects, if any, they may have on the relationship between religion and the propensity and
timing of remarriage (e.g., confounding or moderating effects).
For centuries, marriage has been intricately interwoven with the ethics of
Christian churches. While there have been recent changes in the family doctrines of
many religious groups, most Christian churches continue to value marriage and family
life (Thornton, Axinn and Hill 1992). “The Creator made them male and female, and
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said, ‘For this reason a man will leave his father and mother and be united to his wife,
and the two will become one flesh… so they are no longer two, but one. Therefore, what
God has joined together, let no man separate’” (Mat 19:4, KJV). According to Call and
Heaton (1997), religious affiliation is important because different denominational
teachings regarding marriage, divorce and remarriage can influence one’s attitudes and
subsequent marital behaviors. Others suggest that religious affiliation could also reflect
common worldviews of a particular religious culture rather than specific doctrinal beliefs
(Call and Heaton 1997). This observation is supported by research on denominational
variations in marriage timing. For example, after controlling for a large number of
sociodemographic variables, Xu et al. (2005) found that men and women who are
affiliated with Mormon, conservative and moderate Protestant denominations show a
greater propensity to marry and marry at much younger ages than those who are not
affiliated with a faith tradition. And both men and women of the Mormon faith tradition
married significantly earlier than conservative Protestants. They noted that both of these
faith traditions tend to place a greater emphasis on the importance of marriage.
In addition to religious affiliation, religious salience and worship service
attendance are essential to understanding the effect of religion on marriage propensity
and timing. Previous literature suggests that the “doctrines of a particular religion
influence union formation because they have an impact on the perceived costs and
benefits of various decisions. The effects should, therefore, be stronger for those
individuals who adhere more closely to the teachings of their faith.” (Lehrer 2004:168).
Carroll, Linford, Holman and Busby (2000) conducted a research to investigate
the effect religious beliefs had on marital and family orientations. Among Catholic,
12

Protestant and Latter-day Saint (Mormon) groups, they selected the most highly religious
respondents based on four questions and compared them on three categories of marriage
and family variables: (1) premarital values and marital role expectations, (2) beliefs about
marriage and the family, and (3) personal relationship characteristics. They found that
highly religious Mormons and highly religious Catholics and Protestants were similar on
some issues and different in a number of values, beliefs and behaviors regarding marriage
and family life. According to their research, all of the religious groups were similar in
their strong commitment to marriage, low acceptance of premarital sex, high levels of
relationship satisfaction and good relationship stability. Carroll et al. explained that this
could be the result of being highly committed to the spiritual lifestyle, meaning that
religion was important in their daily lives, viewed themselves as religious, frequently
attended religious services, and felt that attending religious services was important. Their
findings were “consistent with past research that found that highly religious marriages
and families are happier, more successful, and more likely to avoid divorce, substance
abuse and sexual promiscuity, than families not committed to a religiously-oriented way
of life” (p. 202). Some differences between these groups surfaced as well. Highly
religious Mormons were less likely to engage in premarital sex and more likely to support
a traditional division of labor in marriage, more likely to desire a large family and
perceive themselves as being more ready for marriage. “These differences likely reflect
particularistic Mormon theology, which stresses the eternal nature of marriage and family
relationships, includes strong beliefs of saving sexual intimacy for marriage, and holds
the separation of gender roles is divinely decreed” (Carroll et al. 2000: 202).
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Carroll et al. also found evidence supporting their assumption that Mormons
would be more similar to Catholics and Protestants than they would be to those claiming
no religious affiliation. “It appears that being a highly religious person is associated with
more stability and satisfaction with close relationships. This may be associated with
living according to a spiritually-oriented code, being together as a family in religious
worship, sharing a common purpose and hearing weekly reminders of Christian values”
(Carroll et. al. 2000: 203).
In a 1997 study of mainline Protestants, conservative Protestants and Catholics,
researchers found that, in regard to the role of religion in union formation, the individuals
who attended church most frequently had the most traditional stance regarding union
formation (Lehrer 2004b). This was true for all groups. In other words, those who
attended church more frequently were less likely to cohabit and more likely to marry.
This consistence across denominational affiliations reinforces findings that religious
groups are traditionally family oriented and tend to promote the marriage state over other
union alternatives. Likewise, Lehrer found that among Protestants and Catholics, those
who attended religious services frequently had a relatively lower probability of
cohabiting than their less religious counterparts. He found that the effect of religiosity
was most pronounced for conservative Protestants.
Thornton et al. (1992) concluded that the importance of religion (salience) and
attendance (e.g., worship service attendance) were more powerful determinants of
marriage and cohabitation than religious (denominational) affiliation. They found that
the marital behavior of young people was influenced by their religious commitment and
participation more so than religious affiliation. Low levels of religious importance and
14

participation were related to high rates of cohabitation and low rates of marriage, in that,
less religious young people were much more likely than their more religious peers to
cohabit than to marry. However, they also found that people without a religious
affiliation were more likely to cohabit and less likely to marry than those who identified
with a religious group.

Religion, Divorce and Remarriage
Not only does religion affect marriage, it affects divorce and remarriage as well.
A greater stigmatization of divorce can be associated with higher values being placed on
marriage and subsequent remarriage in the wake of a divorce. Numerous studies have
reported different rates of divorce for different religious groups, and the evidence
suggests that overall the rates are lower among Jews, Catholics and more conservative
groups, such as Mormons, who place a strong emphasis on marital stability. However,
the rates are higher among Protestants (taking into account the variations across
Protestant groups) and those with no religious preference (Heaton, Albrecht and Martin
1985). For example, Coombs and Zumeta (1970) found lower divorce rates among
Catholics and those listing “other” as their religious preference than among
Fundamentalists and Baptists. Previous studies also report that Jewish couples have the
lowest rates of divorce, while Protestant couples have the highest rates and Catholics are
intermediate. These reports are further sustained by subsequent studies reporting the
lowest rates of divorce among Catholics, followed by Jews and Mormons and those with
the highest rates among Protestants and those with no religious affiliation (Heaton et al.
1985).
15

Today, most religious denominations, while not condoning divorce, have
developed coping mechanisms to deal with this unfortunate event. Despite the teachings
of the Bible, divorce has permeated American society, including the Christian community
(House and Laney 1973). As a result, pastors, religious luminaries, and the laity of
different religious groups have had to work around the original teachings of the Bible.
Obviously, there are conservative and liberal adaptations, along with those that fall
somewhere in the middle. For instance,
“Divorce is evidence that some people, Christians as well as nonChristians, do not realize a permanent marriage, and that in this, as in
other relationships, we do not measure up to the absolute commandments
of God. Yet, while divorce is evidence of our sinfulness and cannot be
condoned, it may be forgiven. The Apostle Paul recognized this fact and
tried to bring health and wholeness into humanity's broken existence (1
Corinthians 7:10-16).”
(http://www.covchurch.org/cov/resources/divorce.html).
According to the Catholic tradition, marriage is considered a sacrament and
permanent. Hornik (2001) explains that despite common misperceptions, the Catholic
Church does not excommunicate divorced parishioners, but it does, however, prohibit
second marriages without an annulment. The church also forbids remarried Catholics
without annulments from receiving Communion (Hornik 2001). That is, remarriage
without an annulment results in an inability to receive sacraments. Previous studies show
that Catholics have tended to marry at a later age and have been more likely to have
never married (Sander 1993 and 1995).
Studies also show that Catholics have been less likely to divorce. Sander argues
that this could “first be due to the fact that Catholics search more intensively for a mate
because of the higher ‘cost’ of making a wrong choice.” Second, Sander argues that “if
16

Catholics were less likely to practice birth control once married, they might postpone
marriage to reach a higher socioeconomic level before entering marriage. Third,
Catholics might postpone marriage because of parental opposition to marrying a nonCatholic or because of non-Catholics’ norms regarding intermarriage. Finally, the
Catholic Church discourages divorce, thus increasing the ‘cost’ of divorce” (Sander
1993:374). However, though it has been reported that Catholic divorce is lower than
some other religious affiliations, similar to people of other faiths, 25% of today’s 51
million Catholics have divorced and at least half of all divorced Catholics will eventually
remarry (Hornik 2001). It is true that in comparison to some other religious traditions,
Catholics have historically had stricter teachings regarding divorce. Therefore, in the
case of divorce, those of the Catholic tradition may be wary of rushing into another
marriage. This, then, would lead to decreased incidence of remarriage and later timing of
remarriage following divorce.
Despite the fact that different faith traditions have divergent views toward
divorce, it has been suggested that Protestants, on the whole, tend to believe that…
“Jesus’ teaching on marriage and divorce in the New Testament shows
the ideal way to which all Christians should aspire. They accept that
humans fall short of this ideal because we live in a fallen world where
humans have rejected God. Many Protestants accept divorce, though it
would never be encouraged. Most Protestants allow divorced people to
remarry within the church, but they may first wish to talk things through
with the couple. Anglicans share the view of Protestants. Since 1987,
vicars have been allowed to decide if they are prepared to marry people
who have previously been divorced. Most Anglican priests offer people a
“blessing” after a service in a registry office. This means that they do not
actually get married in church, but they do ask God to bless their
marriage”
(http://www.request.org.uk/issues/topics/divorce/divorce04.htm).
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However, even among evangelical or conservative Protestants, views toward
remarriage differ markedly. A scrupulous review of the contemporary religious discourse
reveals diverse attitudes and worldviews. The key demarcation that sets them apart is the
varying degree of biblical literalism. In other words, how literally the adherents interpret
the Bible regarding remarriage will determine the extent to which they tolerate or accept
remarriage, albeit remarriage has become a common life course transition in today’s
American society. Many religious groups, for example, do advocate that it is necessary
to adapt to social changes in order to retain membership. One way in which some
Protestant groups accommodate increasing numbers of divorced members is to accept
divorce and allow divorcees to redeem themselves from the stigmatization of divorce
through remarriage. At the risk of oversimplification, remarriage among Protestants can
be classified into two broad but distinctive categories: one that deems remarriage
“adulterous” representing biblical literalism and the other that views remarriage as
“redemptive” signifying an adaptive and accommodating approach.
The position of “adulterous remarriage” is highly likely to be taken by Protestant
affiliations that adhere very closely to the teachings of the Bible. According to certain
religious traditions,
“The Bible forbids divorce and remarriage under all circumstances. This
is a common viewpoint of Fundamentalist and other Evangelical Christian
denominations. Some terminate the memberships of members when they
divorce. Other congregations limit the positions that divorced persons can
hold in the church” (http://www.religioustolerance.org/div_noway.htm).
As such, divorce and remarriage can be viewed negatively: “divorce is always an act of
sin and, based on Matthew 19:9, is the equivalent of committing adultery. According to a
leading spokesperson of conservative Protestantism, anyone who remarries is living in a
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continual state of adultery.” (Dobson 1980: 42). This is so because “God’s will is one
man for one woman, for one lifetime.” (Dobson 1980:24). The Bible states…
“And he answered and said unto them, have ye not read, that he which
made them at the beginning made them male and female, And said, for this
cause shall a man leave father and mother, and shall cleave to his wife:
and they shall be one flesh? Wherefore they are no more twain, but one
flesh. What therefore God hath joined together, let not man put asunder
(Matthew 19:4-6)” (Dobson 1980: 24).

Similarly, the Bible further states,
“Yet ye say, Wherefore? Because the LORD hath been witness between
thee and the wife of thy youth, against whom thou hast dealt
treacherously: yet is she thy companion, and the wife of thy covenant. And
did not he make one? Yet had he the residue of the spirit. And wherefore
one? That he might seek a godly seed. Therefore take heed to your spirit,
and let none deal treacherously against the wife of his youth. For the
LORD, the God of Israel, saith that he hateth putting away: for one
covereth violence with his garment, saith the LORD of hosts: therefore
take heed to your spirit, that ye deal not treacherously (Malachi 2:14-16
KJV)” (http://www.religioustolerance.org/div_noway.htm).

Here, “Malachi is condemning Hebrew men for abandoning their wives after many years
of marriage and marrying a different woman. Here, marriage is referred to as a covenant
between God, the husband and wife. One property of a covenant is that it is permanent.
The contract between God and the ancient Hebrews at Sinai is one example of a
covenant” (http://www.religioustolerance.org/div_noway.htm).
Another version of “adulterous” remarriage suggests that the Bible allows divorce
but forbids divorced people to remarry. According to this view,
“Although divorce is permitted, neither party is free to remarry. Only if
one dies may the other ex-spouse marry. As far as this view of the Bible is
concerned, a married couple can separate. They can even obtain a divorce
from the courts. But God considers that the bonds of the original marriage
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contract continue. Thus, any remarriage would be illicit. A divorced
person is expected to remain celibate and without a partner for the rest of
their life, or until their former spouse dies -- whichever occurs first”
(http://www.religioustolerance.org/div_ok1.htm).
However, less biblical Protestant groups, such as Mainline Protestants, take a
different approach, which can be summarized into two more forgiving views: (1) the
conditional view that accepts remarriage in the incidence of adultery or desertion, and (2)
the unconditional view that allows remarriage under any circumstance.
“The Bible allows marital separation and divorce. But unless the divorce
was on the grounds of adultery or desertion, remarriage involves adultery.
This is sometimes referred to as the ‘Protestant View,’ although it is by no
means accepted by all Protestants. It is found most often among mainline
Protestant denominations. Various denominations allow remarriage only
to the ‘innocent’ spouse”
(http://www.religioustolerance.org/div_ok2.htm).
Jay Adams (1980), a Christian pastor and writer, suggests that “the concept of
divorce is biblical… certain provisions are made for it… and divorce, for some persons,
under some circumstances is altogether proper and not the object of God’s hatred” (p.
23). For this reason, Adams states that it is important to develop a balanced, biblical
attitude toward divorce. Even those that obtain an “unbiblical divorce” shall not be
treated as if they have committed an “unpardonable sin,” according to Adams. “Let us
make it clear, then, those who wrongfully (sinfully) obtain a divorce must not be excused
for what they have done; it is a sin. But precisely because it is a sin, it is forgivable”
(Adams 1980: 24). Remarriage following divorce is also a complicated and emotionally
charged issue for Christians. Contrary to the belief of some conservative Christians,
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“remarriage, in itself, was well thought of in the New Testament church” (Adams 1980:
24). I Corinthians 7:27, 28a reads:
“Are you bound to a wife? Don’t seek to be released. Have you been
released from a wife? Don’t seek a wife. But if you marry, there is not
sin in doing so” (Adams 1980: 84).
Therefore, according to Adams, “It is important to understand that the position of those
who hold that under no circumstances whatever may a divorced person remarry is totally
unwarranted” (Adams 1980: 84-5).
There are still other Christians that not only accept remarriage but also encourage
it. Some Protestant groups, while still holding very strong pro-family attitudes, accept
that divorce has become a common part of family life in America today, thus having
made adjustments in their teachings to accommodate those that may find themselves in
this unfortunate situation. “As the fortunes of the family/household type [two parents
with children] rise and fall, so will the fortunes of mainstream organized Protestants”
(Wilcox 2002; 288).
Another view, held only by the most liberal Protestant groups, is that divorce and
remarriage are accepted.
“This view has been well argued by author Larry Richards who states,
‘those prohibiting all divorces, and those which allow divorces but not
remarriage -- are based on the invalid belief that marriage is indissoluble,
except after the death of one spouse. The Bible does not teach this
Divorces and subsequent remarriage are acceptable responses to a failed
marriage, on grounds of adultery, desertion and many other behaviors.’”
(http://www.religioustolerance.org/div_ok3.htm).
Despite the increased acceptance of divorce among some Christians, such as
mainline and other more liberal Protestants, strong pro-family attitudes remain intact. As
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a result, remarriage is seen as a redemptive path through which to overcome the
stigmatization of divorce. This approach, “redemptive remarriage,” taken by some
Protestants and other Christians, may lead to increased propensity of remarriage
following divorce.
“To believe that God damns people for a failed relationship is to avoid the
redemptive flow of God’s relationship with people. God’s approach to
divorced people is redemption. On some rare occasions, divorced people
remarry the people they divorced and the second time around goes pretty
well. This is a very special kind of redemption, but not the only kind.
Other divorced people find someone else to marry and it goes well. They
have learned a great deal from the past and apply those lessons in the new
relationship” (http://smartstepfamilies.blogspot.com/2006/08/redemptionafter-divorce.html).
Indeed, in terms of remarriage, research has shown that Protestant denominations,
in general, have the highest rates of remarriage of all religious groups (Wu and
Schimmele 2005). Liberal faith traditions tend to have lower rates of remarriage due to
the fact that their adherents are more likely to cohabit. On the other hand, because of
their pro-nuptial theologies, conservative Protestants and Mormons place the greatest
emphasis on the marriage state and childbearing within the institution of marriage. As a
result, the likelihood of remarriage for these religious groups is higher than their liberal
counterparts.
As can be seen, there are identifiable differences across religious affiliations
regarding divorce and remarriage. However, while attitudes toward divorce and
remarriage may vary across religious groups, they are only part of the religious
experience (Call and Heaton 1997). As noted in the previous literature, some research
has suggested that religious salience and attendance are also factors affecting the
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probability of obtaining a divorce (Booth, Johnson, Branaman and Sica 1995; Call and
Heaton 2001; Lehrer 2004). Instead of examining religious belief and attendance
separately, much of the literature explored here, lumps other factors together with
religious belief and attendance, thus forming the religiosity variable to measure the total
effect that religion may have on divorce.
According to Lehrer (2004), religiosity encompasses commitment to the religion,
the strength of religious beliefs, and participation in religious activities. Lehrer suggests,
“religiosity influences demographic outcomes such as entry into marriage, and divorce
because it accentuates the effects of affiliation, and partly because it’s generally positive
influence on health and well-being, can have repercussions for such outcomes” (p. 707).
Previous studies have shown that an increase in religiosity has been negatively related to
probability of divorce. Those who are more religious in their beliefs (salience) tend to be
slightly less likely to divorce (Booth et al. 1995). Booth, et al. suggest that because many
religious groups discourage divorce and promote marriage and family, marital difficulties
may lead couples to increase their religious participation in order to strengthen their
relationship. “The church is a family-centered institution and an appropriate vehicle to
extend the couple’s relations with each other. Attending church services, taking part in
church socials and praying together may enhance couple interaction in a supportive
environment” (Booth et al. 1995:663). Booth et al. also suggest that, for the same reason
(because religious groups tend to discourage divorce), couples that have marital
difficulties may opt to refrain from religious activities “in order to distance themselves
from their spouse and to avoid reminders that divorce is immoral or not encouraged” (p.
663). In the final analysis, their research findings show that increases in religiosity
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(measured by a combination of five factors: reading religious materials, prayer, religious
attendance, participation in religious social events and religious influence) did not
necessarily improve marital relations but slightly decreased the probability of considering
divorce.
The most important religious factor affecting divorce, however, is worship service
attendance. “Attendance at religious services and activities indicates the amount of time
spent at church and the level of involvement in religious social networks” (Call and
Heaton 1997:383), which in turn influences the strength of the tie a person has with a
specific religious theology. For instance, Thornton et al. (1992) found that the marital
behavior of young people was influenced by their religious commitment and participation
more so than religious affiliation. Previous research also suggests that participation in
religious activities “affects the amount of indoctrination a person receives in a particular
theology.” (Call and Heaton 2001:383). This assertion is supported by a qualitative study
conducted by Gonzalez (1999). To understand how the Protestant church affects
individuals who are going through the marriage, divorce, remarriage process, Gonzalez
interviewed what he termed Protestant prophetic (conservative) and priestly (liberal)
pastors. He found that one common factor among the prophetic pastors was their
acceptance of a literal interpretation of the Bible, which states, “God hates divorce
regardless of circumstance” (p. 149). Thus, while they understand that divorce is
inevitable in some circumstances, it should be avoided if at all possible. But they also
feel that there is someone at fault when divorce occurs. Among prophetic pastors,
personal positions on remarriage, however, were much more diverse than the positions
they took on divorce. Gonzalez found that all of the pastors would remarry an individual
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if they were declared “innocent” in a divorce based on adultery or abandonment. The
guilty party, however, was not eligible for remarriage within the church. The majority of
the pastors interviewed said that they would grant remarriage to a person “if the person
demonstrates that they have had a ‘true’ conversion experience since the divorce, and
he/she could no longer return to his/her ex-spouse because of legal constraints or because
of the refusal of the other party to reconcile” (p. 150). Gonzalez found that only “half of
the pastors indicated that they would consider remarrying a divorced person if the former
spouse was already remarried and the person entered into some form of repentance
counseling in the church” (p. 150).
On the other hand, while priestly pastors still spoke negatively of divorce, they
were generally positive about those who were divorced and they were accepting of
situations in which problems within the marriage outweighed the negative effects of
divorce, and were willing to perform remarriage in these situations. There were some
circumstances under which priestly pastors would not participate in a remarriage
ceremony, which were different from the situations cited by the prophetic pastors. The
pastors’ most common reason for not officiating a remarriage ceremony was if there was
concern for the success of the new marriage. Overall, the researcher found that church
members, especially those who identify strongly with their religion are heavily influenced
by their religious doctrines and make decisions reflective of these doctrines.
Thus far, this body of literature has suggested that religious belief and attendance
can strengthen the influence that a particular doctrine has on individuals’ marital and remarital behaviors. But as reported by Lehrer (2004), effects of religiosity (i.e., religious
belief and attendance) were not uniform across various faith traditions. Conservative
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Protestants, for example, attended church more frequently, thus “if analyses do not
consider differences in religious involvement, some of the estimated ‘conservative
Protestant’ effect may actually be a religiosity effect” (p. 721).
The relationship between religion and marriage, divorce and remarriage is multidimensional and can be affected or confounded by a host of other variables, including but
not limited to, education, employment, fertility and rural-urban residence. In what
follows, I will review some of these variables. In doing so, I explore the relationship
each of these variables has to denominational affiliation, religious salience, worship
service attendance and remarriage.

Fertility
“Despite changes in the nature of the American family life, social norms continue
to support childbearing.” (Heaton, Jacobson and Fu 1992:244). Not surprisingly, one of
the biggest supporters of pronatalist values is religion. Previous literature shows that the
most striking differences in childlessness are between the non-religious and the religious.
Likewise, research suggests that those without children demonstrate the lowest levels of
religiosity (Heaton et al. 1992). Heaton et al suggest that “the relationship between
religion and childlessness emerges through a complex process wherein religious
institutions emphasize teaching aimed at families, provide communities of association
which support family life and perform rituals to recognize and legitimate family
transitions, while parents with children turn to religion for assistance in socializing
children” (Heaton et al. 1992:245). However, there are diverse fertility patterns that
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emerge within and among religious groups. Research has shown that these fertility
patterns vary by religious affiliation, belief and attendance.
Mosher, Williams and Johnson (1992) conducted a study of religion and fertility
patterns in the United States and found that the patterns had changed somewhat since the
babyboom era. In the 1950s and 1960s, there were high rates of fertility among Catholics
and lower rates among Protestants. Mosher et al.’s more recent analysis shows that this
Protestant-Catholic difference in fertility is reversed in that, now Catholics report lower
fertility than Protestants. But the largest fertility differences by religious affiliation
among white women were between Protestants and those with no affiliation. The fertility
of married women with no religious affiliation was the lowest of any group of married
women (Heaton et al. 1992). Protestants reported 37 percent more children than those
with no religious affiliation. This finding was further confirmed in a study conducted by
Heaton et al. (1992) who also found that, among white women, Catholics, Jews and those
with no affiliation have significantly fewer children than Protestants. This is especially
surprising for Catholics because of the negative views they have historically held
concerning birth control. Although the amount of “children ever born” was lower for
Catholics than Protestants, a measure of “total births expected” yielded higher averages
for Catholics than that of Protestants as well as that of other religious groups. Despite the
differences in empirical measures, the overall findings lend further support to the profamily and pronatalist views shared by most faith traditions. Unlike their Protestant and
Catholic counterparts, Mosher et al. report that fertility rates among Jewish women is
lower than that of both Protestants and Catholics, and this pattern has remained stable
over the past 20 years. Not surprisingly, this finding is consistent with previous literature
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suggesting that Jewish couples tend to be non-traditional and less committed to
childbearing (Goldscheider 1967).
In their exploration of the previous literature, Keysar and Kosmin (1995) argue
that the relationship between religion and fertility in the United States shows that
marriage patterns differ by religion and this could be a result of the variations in gender
ideologies across the different denominations. This position is further explicated by
Lehrer (2004) who reports that women who marry early will be more likely to begin
having children, which would take away from time that could be devoted to their
educational endeavors. According to many conservative Christian authors, “Women who
work outside the home while their children are young are seen as the root cause of
divorce, infidelity, juvenile delinquency, teen pregnancy, pornography, homosexuality,
and male unemployment. Further, conservative Christian writers characterize working
mothers as unhappy, unfulfilled, libertines destined for loneliness and failure” (Sherkat
2000: 346). As a result, the most important thing for many conservative Christian
women is to become a wife and mother, and when young children are present, they
believe that their place is, without a doubt, in the home. Sherkat examined the roles of
conservative Christian women and hypothesized that women who closely follow the
Bible will be more likely to become housewives, become housewives earlier in life and
be more likely to remain housewives. His results supported his assumptions. Indeed,
“fundamentalist [conservative] women are significantly more likely to choose the home
as their career in their early life course (Sherkat 2000: 354). This supports previous and
subsequent literature suggesting that conservative Christian women will be more likely to
become wives and mothers and do so earlier than their more liberal counterparts. In
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general, the above-reviewed literature suggests that religious affiliations that support
more traditional gender ideologies may discourage higher education and work outside the
home for women, which in turn leads to earlier childbearing and higher fertility. In other
words, because conservative women frequently opt against education and career in favor
of marriage and children, this leaves fewer options for women in the incidence of
divorce. Without an education and career to support themselves and their children,
women may be more likely to remarry than their less conservative counterparts.
Not only are there variations in fertility by religious affiliation, research has also
shown that there are variations by degree of religious belief and religious attendance.
Heaton et al. (1992) found that, “Those with no religious preference, who never attend
church, disagree with traditional Bible beliefs and have civil rather than religious
wedding ceremonies are more likely than others to be childless.” (Heaton et al. 1992:2523). Moreover, they found that frequency of attendance, over religious affiliation and
belief in the Bible, had the strongest relationship with childlessness. Heaton et al. stated
that the strongest predictor among all of the religion variables (religious affiliation,
religious belief, religious attendance and religious ritualism) was church attendance and it
remained statistically significant for women when other religious variables were
included. Similarly, Mosher et al. (1992) state that there is a direct relationship between
religious participation and fertility, and although it varied in significance, this
relationship was consistent across different faith traditions.
According to the traditional ideology historically synonymous with conservative
religious groups, a woman’s focus should be on taking care of her husband and children,
not education and career. For example, the Mormon and conservative Protestant faiths
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make a clear distinction between the roles of males and females, encouraging the
traditional division of labor within the household. “Consistent with the view that such
religious affiliations provide institutionalized moral support and psychic rewards to
mothers who stay home with their children, previous research documents a lower level of
female employment among members of these faiths when young children are present”
(Lehrer 2004:165). Conversely, while many evangelicals support separate spheres for
husbands to be a provider and wives to be a homemaker, a growing population of
“egalitarian evangelicals” support “domestic task sharing and co-parenting” (Bartkowski
2001). According to this emerging view,
“‘The couple who wants an equal-partnership marriage must… strive to
avoid falling into the stifling trap of gender-role stereotyping, which
stresses differences and separate spheres, driving men and women apart
rather than drawing them together. Christian marriage should be the kind
of relationship that encourages both spouses to grow in Christ to exhibit
the fruit of Spirit.’”
Indeed, Gay, Ellison and Powers (1996), report that in regard to pro-family orientation
and other social attitudes and behaviors, conservative denominations exhibit less within
group homogeneity than their less conservative counterparts.
For women belonging to conservative religious groups advocating separate
spheres, the “psychic rewards” associated with the marriage state and motherhood may
encourage them to adhere to these traditional gender ideologies. Therefore, as previously
mentioned, these women are less likely to pursue education and a career, leaving them
with fewer alternatives to the marriage state. As a result, they will be more likely to
remarry in the case of divorce, and will remarry sooner. Similarly, they will be more
likely than their less conservative counterparts to feel pressured to remarry for the
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purposes of childbearing. The average time between first marriage and divorce in the
United States for women is close to eight years (Census 2001), but some marriages end
even earlier. Thus, it is possible that some religious women who have not had children or
have not had as many as they wish to have at the time of divorce may see remarriage as a
pathway to achieve their childbearing goals for higher fertility. For this reason, fertility
history must be statistically controlled when modeling the relationship between religion
and propensity and timing of remarriage.

Education
Many socioeconomic variables have been linked to an increase in liberal attitudes
and tolerance in regard to numerous social issues including family and gender ideologies.
One such variable that has been researched extensively is how liberal attitudes, especially
gender role attitudes, vary by education. It has been consistently reported that education
and liberal attitudes are positively correlated (Gay et al. 1996). Those with higher
degrees of education are less likely to support gender traditionalism. Women who pursue
higher education are more likely to develop careers outside the home and less likely to
adhere to the more traditional domestic roles of housewife and mother. Research has also
shown that gender role attitudes and degree of education vary across religious
denominations. Those who belong to conservative denominations are likely to be less
educated and endorse more traditional family roles, whereas those who belong to liberal
denominations are typically better educated and less traditional (Keysar and Kosmin
1995; Sherkat and Darnell 1999). “The sociological literature dealing with gender has
treated the socioeconomic dependence of women upon marriage… as one of the
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hallmarks of traditionalism. Religion is widely recognized as important in creating
cultural communities, which in turn directly influence their adherent’s attitudes and
behavior toward gender ideologies in society” (Keysar and Kosmin 1995:49).
Traditional gender ideologies support the gendered division of labor that assigns
the role of caregiver to women and provider responsibilities to men. And many faith
traditions do adhere to these traditional ideologies, thus perpetuating the economic
dependency of women. According to Keysar and Kosmin, a greater emphasis on
domestic roles (marriage and childbearing) discourages women from pursuing education
and a career. Therefore, “Religious prescriptions about the importance of family, and
particularly about women’s primary role in childbearing and rearing may explain much of
the variation between religious groups” (Keysar and Kosmin 1995:51). To assess the
impact that religion has on the educational attainment of American women, Keysar and
Kosmin found that differences in educational attainment for women across religious
denominations were attributable to their religion for both younger and older cohorts. The
highest levels of education were found in the most liberal affiliations. Jewish faiths are
classified as being at the most liberal end of the spectrum and exhibited the strongest
tendency toward higher education (Hartman and Hartman 1996). This research also
endorses the liberal-conservative hierarchy of religious groups suggested by previous
literature, supporting the link between education, liberal attitudes and religious affiliation.
Similarly, a study conducted by Lehrer (2004) on white American women found that
educational attainment was the highest for Jewish women, lowest for conservative
Protestants, with Catholics and mainline Protestants at the center of the distribution.
Within a human capital framework, researchers have found that “religious affiliation is
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viewed as reflecting distinctive features of the home environment that affect both the
returns and costs of additional investments in education.” (Lehrer 2004:164). Lehrer’s
research further supports the hypothesis that women who pursue education will be more
likely to delay marriage because it is difficult to combine the role of student and spouse.
“Religious groups that promote high levels of investment in secular human capital thus
also encourage, indirectly, a late transition to marriage. This channel of causality implies
that Jews would delay entry into marriage, while conservative Protestants would tend to
marry early.” (Lehrer 2004:164). It logically follows, then, that this would continue to
hold true for remarriage as well.
As noted earlier, fundamentalist religious affiliations tend to be one of the most
conservative and “subscribe to a vividly otherworldly belief system that is often
antagonistic toward secular education because of the beliefs and values it is viewed to
promote.” (Sherkat and Darnell 1999:24). These ideologies may also be passed onto
children of fundamentalist parents. Sherkat and Darnell examined “how religiously
motivated social constraints (fundamental Christianity) influence educational choices” (p.
24). They explain that a lack of parental support for higher education undermines a
child’s preference for educational attainment. In other words, if children decide not to
follow the faith of their parents, parents may punish the child by not supporting their
educational endeavors. “Parents’ fundamentalism may create anti-intellectual
preferences in children who do not follow their parents’ faith.” (p. 24). According to
Sherkat and Darnell, conservative Christians also tend to have very patriarchal gender
role ideologies, advocating domestic careers for women, and arguing that higher
education may be contrary to God’s plan for most women.
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Other research has corroborated the findings of Sherkat and Darnell. In general,
the finding has been that being a conservative Protestant hinders educational attainment
(Beyerlein 2004). However, Beyerlein suggests that there may be evidence of a more
complex relationship between conservative Protestantism and educational attainment.
Some researchers, instead of grouping all conservative Protestants together, have
conceptualized them as three separate entities: fundamentalists, Pentecostals and
evangelicals (Beyerlein 2004). “Although the cultural traditions of fundamentalist
Protestantism and Pentecostal Protestantism advocate withdrawing from the broader
culture, the cultural tradition of evangelical Protestantism generally stresses engaging the
broader culture. These differing strategies of action are likely to have differing effects on
the educational pursuits of fundamentalists” (Beyerlein 2004: 506). Indeed, Beyerlein
purports fundamentalist and Pentecostal Protestants are less likely to obtain a college
degree than evangelical Protestants or other non-conservative Protestants. Therefore,
while some Protestants, especially conservative Protestants, will be less likely to support
post secondary education, others may not be so opposed to such endeavors.
Previous studies have shown that educational attainment does delay marriage.
Studies of marital timing and fertility consistently show conservative Protestants have
earlier ages of first marriage and higher rates of fertility, with 43% of female
fundamentalists and 18% of male fundamentalists being married by age 19. Indeed,
Sherkat and Darnell’s research found that “parental support is important for educational
attainment, and when parents are opposed to education for cultural reasons they will
hinder their children’s opportunities for attainment” (p. 32). Not surprisingly, because
conservative Christians tend to support traditional gender ideologies, opposition to
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educational attainment from parents was clearly stronger for females than males. Their
results show “(1) that the educational attainment of nonfundamentalist women is
significantly hampered by fundamentalist parents; (2) that fundamentalist parents do not
differ significantly from nonfundamentalist parents in their support of nonfundamentalist
males or Bible-believing females; (3) and male inerrantist children receive a significant
boost in their educational attainment from fundamentalist parents.” (p. 33).
As we have seen, a consistent finding in the literature is that education delays
marriage, and lack of support for education leads to earlier marriage, especially among
conservative Protestant women (Teachman, Polonko, Leigh 1987; Sherkat and Darnell
1999; Keysar and Kosmin 1995). Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that finishing
one’s education is important in the timing of marriage. While this is the case in first
marriage, it may not be true in the timing of remarriage, since most people entering into
remarriage may have most likely finished their education (Teachman et al. 1987:243).
Mott and Moore (1983) tested the significance of varying factors on the propensity and
timing of remarriage and found that education was one of the most significant predictors.
According to Mott and Moore, a woman with a higher degree of education is more likely
to be employed and more likely to have a job in which she can earn a wage to maintain
herself economically. Both of these factors provide women with an alternative to the
marriage state. Mott and Moore found that this holds true for women in the first year
following divorce and, with few exceptions, continues for the first five years following
divorce as well. However, research has shown that for each additional year of age at
divorce, the greater the time between divorce and remarriage and the smaller the chance
of remarriage. Consequently, women who delay marriage to pursue education will be
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older at the time of divorce, which may prolong remarriage and decrease the chances of
remarriage.
In terms of religiosity (includes measures of commitment to religion, strength of
religious salience or belief and participation in religious activities), the more closely one
adheres to a specific doctrine, or the more important their religious faith is to them, the
more likely they are to apply the values associated with those doctrines to their everyday
lives (Lehrer 2004). For example, more conservative religions have been associated with
more conservative attitudes, which are highly correlated with more traditional gender
ideologies. It can be assumed then, that conservatives who have the strongest religious
salience would likely have the strongest traditional values. Likewise, because it has been
shown that more traditional beliefs translate into lower educational levels among women,
the preceding argument also holds true when examining education level in relation to
religious salience. “If religious affiliation influences economic and demographic
behavior because it has an impact on the perceived costs and benefits of various decisions
made by individuals and families over the life cycle, then the effects should therefore be
stronger for those individuals who participate more frequently in religious observances
and adhere more closely to the teachings of their faith” (Lehrer 2004:719).
Like religious salience or belief, worship service attendance can have effects on
one’s attitudes regarding a number of issues including education. As stated above, if
conservative religions, most notably conservative Protestants, tend to have lower levels
of educational attainment and religiosity heightens the effects of affiliation, we should
expect that higher degrees of religious participation among conservative Protestants
would translate into lower levels of educational attainment among males and females.
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According to Lehrer, however, the opposite is true. He states that “those who attended
church at least once a month during adolescence attain more schooling than their
counterparts raised in less observant homes” (Lehrer, 2004:720). According to Lehrer,
this finding demonstrates that it should no longer be assumed that increased religiosity
accentuates the differences across religious groups. Since education is systematically
correlated with religion and marriage timing, it should be statistically controlled in
investigating how religion affects the propensity and timing of remarriage.

Employment
According to Kulik (2002), employed women tend to have more liberal gender
ideologies than those women who do not work. The same is true of their children. In
fact, the children of mothers who work are less likely to hold traditional gender
ideologies than those whose mothers do not work. As with education, Kulik found that
the more the mother worked, the more liberal the gender ideologies were of her and her
children. Religious faiths that encourage traditional gender ideologies also discourage
education and formal employment for women, which will be perpetuated from generation
to generation. Additionally, a stronger religious belief and a higher degree of religious
participation may increase the effect of these traditional teachings.
It is evident from the previous literature, that conservative religious groups have
traditionally supported a woman’s place being in the home. However, Sherkat (2000)
found little evidence to suggest that, among these conservative groups, these women were
considered incapable of or prohibited from holding careers. “Indeed, Christian women
are encouraged to seek careers if they desire, once their children are grown” (Sherkat
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2000: 347). Therefore, Sherkat hypothesized that despite their commitment to being a
wife and mother, Christian women would be no less likely to reenter the paid workforce
once their children were past the “tender years”. Sherkat’s results supported his
assumptions. “While fundamentalist [conservative] women are significantly more likely
to choose the home as their career in their early life course… conservative Christian
women are likely to reenter the workforce when their children are older” (Sherkat 2000:
354).
Religion can indirectly affect a woman’s decision to pursue family over career or
employment by enforcing more traditional gender ideologies. Typically, religions that
enforce more traditional gender ideologies for men and women will be less likely to
support women’s employment outside the home. Early studies of the Catholic faith
found that they made a clear distinction between male and female roles. However, as
stated by Lehrer (2004), more recent studies suggest that Catholics are less traditional in
these roles than conservative or mainline Protestants. Lehrer further points out that the
commitment of Jewish women to the labor market is much stronger than women of other
religious denominations (also see Hartman and Hartman 1996). Jewish women delay
entry into marriage for several interrelated reasons: 1) their high educational attainment,
2) their low desired level of fertility and 3) their strong commitment to the labor market
(Lehrer 2004). On the other hand, women who are brought up as conservative
Protestants and as Mormons have incentives to marry early, because their faith
encourages an orientation to home activities and also encourages very high fertility in the
case of Mormons (Lehrer 2004). In general, women who are less involved in the labor
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market are more likely to form marital unions and do so sooner, which is particularly
pronounced for women who are affiliated with conservative religious denominations.
In a study of Arab American women in the United States, Read (2004) contends
that religious traditions can restrict women’s achievements by prioritizing their home and
family obligations above everything else. According to Read, Arab American women are
an ethnic group consisting of both Muslims and Christians. “Muslims, however, make up
only one-third of the estimated three million Arabs in America, with Christians
comprising the rest of the population” (Read 2004: 1043). Because this group is
comprised of two very different groups, their participation in the public sphere varies
significantly by ethnicity, religiosity (includes measures for religious attendance, reading
of religious material and belief in scripture), family structure and social class. Lower
employment and higher fertility were found among the women with the strongest
religious connections. Also like studies on other American women, Arab American
women with higher levels of education typically had higher employment rates and
earnings and were more likely to be part of a more egalitarian household. Read’s
research suggested that it was religiosity, as opposed to religious affiliation, that appeared
to have the most significant effect on women’s labor force participation. She concluded
that, “High religiosity over the life cycle and belief in scriptural inerrancy are related to a
lower likelihood of employment among these women” (Read 2004:1047).
Significant support has been given to the hypothesis that religiosity (religious
salience or belief, private prayer and scripture study and religious attendance) is related to
lower labor force participation among women. “Religious values support wife and
mother roles, which influence religious women to remain in the home.” (Chadwick and
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Garrett 1995:278). Also of importance is that women’s employment outside the home
has an effect on religiosity. Some social scientists have argued that the demands of a
full-time job leave less time for religious activities (Chadwick and Garrett 1995). They
also suggest that support systems that may have once been formed in church have now
been transferred to the workplace. Therefore, women no longer need to attend church to
develop friendships. For example, Chadwick and Garrett’s study shows that since the
Mormon doctrine supports pro-family values and encourages married women to focus on
family responsibilities instead of a career, the Mormon adherent’s stronger religious
beliefs (measures included religious values and private religious behaviors) were found to
be closely associated with lower labor force participation, including current employment
status, long-term employment experience and intentions to remain in the labor force.
Thus, “religiosity emerged as a significant correlate of, and perhaps a cause affecting
labor force participation” (Chadwick and Garrett 1995:291). Significantly, they also
found that the relationship between religiosity and employment was not affected by
education, and that even among highly educated LDS women, religiosity and
employment were significantly related.
Like education, various studies have suggested that more liberal gender ideologies
are associated with women working outside the home. It has been suggested that this
may reduce religious involvement. Becker and Hofmeister (2001) explain that while
many researchers link full time employment with increased religious participation, other
researchers found that, for married women, “full-time employment reduces both their
own and their spouses’ religious involvement and… depending on life- stage, full time
labor force participation in an advanced industrial economy may increase women’s
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individualism and decrease their willingness to assume traditionally gendered roles
historically associated with religious institutions” (Becker and Hofmeister 2001:708).
The attitudes, values and beliefs of a woman with full-time employment, as we have
seen, are more likely to be liberal in gender ideologies, which may lead to affiliations
with liberal religious groups or decreased religious participation than if they are
associated with a more conservative religious group.
Following the same line of reasoning, it has been proposed that like education and
employment, income and occupational status appear to also vary across religious
affiliation and can be linked to a delay in marriage and remarriage among women.
“American religion has from the beginning of its history been stratified by education,
income and occupational status… and religious differences have played a role in
constructing social differentiations that sustained socioeconomic inequalities.” (Smith
and Farris 2005:95). According to Smith and Farris, studies find that white conservative
Protestants and white mainline Protestants are significantly separated by social class and
status differences. They measured socioeconomic status by percent of adherents who had
earned college degrees, and their results show that, overall, the highest level of formal
education appears associated with the more liberal traditions, and the lowest among the
most conservative traditions. Religious influences on income and SES are the same as
those of education and employment for women. Those affiliations that support more
traditional gender ideologies support domesticity in women, and therefore, the women
will not pursue educations or careers and, consequently, have lower incomes and lower
SES. Therefore, women belonging to these affiliations may be more likely to remarry
and remarry sooner following divorce.
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According to Wimberly (1984), the issue of religiosity (religious belief,
devotionalism – private worship, and religious experience – contact with the deity) being
related to one’s place in the social hierarchy has been an issue explored by social
scientists since Karl Marx, and many have suggested that socioeconomic deprivation
“leads people to place more emphasis on religion in certain ways… and the related
perspectives of exchange theory and cognitive behaviorism imply that such deprivation
also leads people to place more importance on religion.” (p. 223). Wimberly and others
suggest that religion does not change the conditions of deprivation, it merely provides
compensation. “Deprived persons tend to immerse themselves in religion, finding that it
relieves their suffering.” (p. 223). According to Wimberly, relief comes through the use
of “compensators” (e.g. religion can furnish status not available to many individuals in
the socioeconomic sphere). Wimberly quotes Weber who explains…
“What the [disprivileged classes] cannot claim to be they replace by the
worth of that which they will one day become, to which they will be called
in some future life here or hereafter; or replace by their sense of what they
signify and achieve in the world as seen from the point of view of
providence. Their hunger for a worthiness that has not fallen to their lot,
they and the world being what it is, produces this conception [of]…
significance in the eyes of some divine authority possessing a scale of
values different from the one operating in the world of man” (P. 224).
Wimberly’s findings suggest that “economic deprivation per se does not lead to
an increase in the importance attached to religion; religious salience – how important
religion is to an individual – may instead be a response to social deprivation. One’s
relative social standing in the eyes of others may produce a form of deprivation for which
religion can compensate and thus become salient for the adherent.” (p. 234). The
literature has shown that women of higher socioeconomic status have greater economic
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independence. As a result, they are less dependent on marriage and remarriage for their
livelihood. Previous literature has also shown that women associated with more
conservative religious groups are less likely to work outside the home and more likely to
support traditional gender ideologies. Socioeconomic status, then, can be related to the
propensity and timing of remarriage. Women belonging to more conservative religious
groups are less likely to work outside the home and, therefore, less capable of supporting
themselves leading to more frequent and earlier remarriage. Because socioeconomic
status is correlated with religion and marriage timing, it should be statistically controlled
in investigating how religion affects the propensity and timing of remarriage.
Thus far, I have found religious subcultural variations exhibited in educational
attainment, employment status, and income, all of which are intimately related to the
propensity and timing of marriage and remarriage. Another area in which we can find
religious subcultural differences in the propensity and timing of remarriage is in the
analysis of rural and urban communities.

Rural versus Urban Residence
Religious differences can also be found between rural and urban residents of the
United States. Rural and urban differences have been topics of sociological interest for
many decades, and the findings concerning conservative-liberal attitudes have remained
relatively unchanged. It has been commonly assumed that people in rural areas are
poorer and less educated than their urban counterparts. It has also been commonly
assumed that rural areas tend to be more conservative and more religious than urban
areas. Both current and early literature appear to support these assumptions. Burchinal’s
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1961 study on the religious differences between farm and non-farm areas confirmed these
beliefs. He found that, in spite of cultural changes that were occurring in those areas at
that time, these beliefs still remained in the rural areas.
“It is believed that farm families hold more traditional religious beliefs
and are more active in church and home religious activities than non-farm
families… and since religious beliefs and practices are rooted in value
systems which are not subject to major changes in a short time span, it is
probable that the traditionally assumed farm-nonfarm differences in
religious beliefs and practices still exist” (Burchinal 1961:414).
Indeed, his research found that the data supported the hypothesis that farm parents held
more conservative religious views, participated more frequently in church activities and
more frequently had some religious practices than non-farm parents. If we assume that
those in rural areas are more likely to be affiliated with more conservative, traditional
religious sects, we can then expect that the women in rural areas will adhere to more
traditional gender ideologies leading to earlier marriage and remarriage and higher rates
of fertility.
In a study on adolescent girls, Harriet Light (1970) found that family and religion
were more likely to influence the attitudes of rural than urban girls. She also found that
rural girls continue to accept the conventional ethical standards while urban girls were
more open to new morality (less traditional morals). Likewise, Wallace et al. (2003)
found that young people living in rural areas reported higher levels of religious
importance, more frequent attendance and lower levels of nonaffiliation than their urban
and non-Southern counterparts.
Scanzoni and Arnett (1987) found that rural residents were more religiously
devout than their urban counterparts. However, while taking religious devoutness into
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account, they found that while there were differences in religious devoutness (rural were
more devout than urban), those differences did not seem to matter as greatly as education
and degree of gender traditionalism in distinguishing between rural and urban residents.
They found that years of education were a major distinguishing factor between rural and
urban residents. In rural areas, church is the social center, whereas in urban areas, church
tends to take a backset to education as the social center. Indeed, according to Scanzoni
and Arnett, urban residents were better educated than rural residents. This was even
more substantial for the women in rural areas. “Not only do rural people ‘lag behind
their urban counterparts in virtually all areas of educational attainment… rural women are
more educationally disadvantaged than their urban counterparts.” (p. 433). The
educational lag of rural women, according to Scanzoni and Arnett, contributes to their
lack of participation in the paid labor force, and their increased likelihood of working
lower status, lower paying jobs than urban women. Closely related and of equal power
and significance were the differences in gender traditionalism between the rural and
urban residents. Scanzoni and Arnett found that rural residents had more traditional
gender ideologies than their urban counterparts. It is not clear whether lower education
and more traditional gender ideologies leads to increased religious participation or vice
versa, but it is clear that the two appear to be correlated among the people of rural areas
of the United States.
If it is assumed that more conservative religious affiliations support more
traditional gender ideologies, and it is also assumed that those in rural areas have a
tendency to associate with more conservative religious groups and practice greater gender
traditionalism, then it can also be assumed that women in rural areas will be more likely
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to remarry and remarry sooner than those in urban areas. Indeed research has shown that
there are rural and urban differences in relation to the timing and propensity of
remarriage. Mott and Moore (1983) provide information regarding the significance of
rural versus urban residence in relation to the propensity and timing of remarriage among
women. According to their findings, the ruralness of women’s residence significantly
predicted remarriage as the number of years following divorce increased. They also
found that women living outside metropolitan areas were more likely to remarry than
their more urban counterparts as time goes by. This could possibly be linked to more
traditional gender ideologies and a different remarriage market that is characterized by
close-knit religious networks and widely shared religious cultural values and norms.

Hypotheses
My hypotheses for this research are as follows:
H1:

Net of statistical controls, there will be multidimensional, significant, and
persistent effects of religion on the propensity and timing of remarriage. This
general hypothesis can be partitioned into the following more refined hypotheses.

H2:

There will be significant subcultural variations regarding propensity and timing of
remarriage among different religious groups.

H2a:

Women belonging to conservative religious groups will be more or less likely to
remarry and remarry sooner or later following divorce than their unaffiliated
counterparts, depending upon their views toward remarriage (i.e., adulterous vs.
redemptive).
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H2b:

Women belonging to less conservative religious groups (Mainline Protestants,
Jewish, etc.) will be less likely to remarry and remarry later following divorce
than their more conservative counterparts but more likely to remarry and marry
sooner than the unaffiliated.

H2c:

Catholic women will be less likely to remarry and remarry later following divorce
than women belonging to various Protestant groups and there will be no
significant difference between Catholics and the unaffiliated in the propensity and
timing of remarriage.

H2d:

Those with no religious affiliation will be less likely to remarry and remarry later
than their Protestant counterparts.

H3:

Religious subcultural variations regarding propensity and timing of remarriage
will remain after other religious and sociodemographic factors are statistically
controlled.

H4:

Net of denominational affiliation and sociodemographics, increased religious
salience will be positively associated with the propensity and timing of
remarriage.

H5:

Net of denominational affiliation and sociodemographics, frequency of worship
service attendance will be positively associated with the propensity and timing of
remarriage.

47

CHAPTER III
METHODOLOGY

Data
Data for this study are drawn from two waves of the National Survey of Family
Growth (the 1995 and 2002 cycles). The 1995 wave of the survey was obtained from the
Inter-consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR) and the 2002 wave was
obtained from the National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS). While both waves of
the NSFG are nationally representative, the 1995 wave interviewed women only (n =
10,847). To broaden the scope of the survey, the 2002 wave interviewed both women (n
= 7,643) and men (n = 4,928). Unfortunately, the small sample size for divorced men in
the 2002 wave does not warrant reliable statistical analysis across religious groups, thus
they were omitted from this study.
Surveys for the NSFG were based on personal interviews conducted in the homes
of a national sample of women 15-44 years of age in the civilian, non-institutionalized
population of the United States. Interviewing for the 1995 NSFG was conducted in
January through October of 1995 by Research Triangle Institute, Inc., and interviewing
for the 2002 NSFG was conducted from January 2002 to March 2003 by the Institute for
Social Research (ISR). Both were under contract to the National Center for Health
Statistics.
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The main purpose of the surveys was to provide reliable national data on
marriage, divorce, contraception, infertility and the health of women and infants in the
United States. These two waves of the NSFG contain excellent and detailed questions
concerning respondents’ demographic information, pregnancy history, adoption-related
information, fertility, family formation, contraceptive use, marital (remarital) and
cohabitation history, making them ideal for this study. To ensure an adequate sample
size for each faith tradition, this study used a pooled two-wave subsample of everdivorced women. There are, however, limitations to the data because the 2002 wave
public use data set does not contain detailed denominational groupings. Therefore, the
analysis cannot be performed for distinctive groups such as the Jewish and Mormon faith
traditions.

Dependent Variables
For this study, the dependent variables are (1) the propensity of remarriage
including those who have remarried versus those who have not remarried following
divorce and (2) remarriage timing or the waiting time to second marriage for those who
divorced (including only individuals who are remarried). Remarriage timing was
measured by the respondent’s waiting time to remarry in century months (calculated as
year of divorce * 12 + month).
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Independent Variables
There are two denominational affiliation variables available in the two waves of
the public use National Survey of Family Growth data. However, only current
denominational affiliation was used, and recoded into six groups:
I.

Catholic

II.

Conservative Protestant (Baptist/Southern Baptist and fundamentalist
Protestant)

III.

Mainline Protestant (Methodist, Lutheran, Presbyterian, Episcopal and
Church of Christ1)

IV.

Other Protestant (Mormon and other unspecified Protestants)

V.

Other Faith Traditions (e.g., Jewish, Muslim and Buddhist)

VI.

Not Affiliated (religious nones)

This variable was further dummy-coded with unaffiliated as the reference category to
delineate denominational variations in the propensity and timing of remarriage.
In addition to the above denominational affiliation variable, the respondent’s
religious salience and worship service attendance were also included. Religious salience
was measured by the question: “Currently, how important is religion in your daily life?
Would you say it is very important, somewhat important, or not important?” Worship
service attendance was measured by the question: “About how often do you attend
religious services?” Responses to both questions were reverse-coded on Likert scales

1

Church of Christ, viewed as a conservative Protestant denomination
(Steensland et al. 2000), was placed under the heading of mainline Protestant
because the data obtained from the National Center for Health Statistics
(NCHS) classified them as such.
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with values for the first question ranging from 1 = not important to 3 = very important
and values for the second question ranging from 1 = never to 5 = more than once a week.

Control Variables
To eliminate potential confounding effects and spuriousness, several statistical
controls were included in this study. Previous research on remarriage timing had
routinely investigated such marital history measures as age at first marriage, the duration
of first marriage, and age at divorce or separation (Bumpass and Sweet 1990; Coleman,
Ganong and Fine 2000; Sweeny 1997; Wilson and Clark 1992). Age at first marriage in
this study was simply measured by respondent’s actual age at the time of first marriage.
Likewise, age at divorce was measured by respondents’ actual age at the time of divorce.
Duration of first marriage was originally included in the statistical analysis, but removed
due to issues of multicollinearity.
Furthermore, based on previous studies, a number of sociodemographic
characteristics such as respondents’ sex, race, resident children or prior fertility,
employment status, total family income and educational attainment were statistically
controlled (Bumpass and Sweet 1990; Coleman and Ganong 1990; Coleman, Ganong and
Fine 2000; Sweeney 1997; Wilson and Clark 1992). Since this study analyzed divorced
women only, sex is controlled by default. Respondents’ race and ethnicity were
combined and dummy coded into African American, Hispanic and Other racial/ethnic
group with white as the reference category. Respondents’ prior fertility was
approximated by the number of residential children at the time of study. Since the age of
women in the study ranges from15 to 44, having adult children at home is unlikely.
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Respondents’ educational attainment measured as highest grade completed, total family
income and employment status (dummy coded with unemployed as the reference) were
all included as the respondent’s SES measures. Two additional measures that are
pertinent to the remarriage market were controlled. First, a metro and non-metro variable
was dummy coded (with non-metro as the reference category) to gauge a possible
remarriage market difference due to geographical variations. Second, a dummy coded
variable indicating the data source was included to control for differential remarriage
rates across the two time periods (the two waves).
Two additional control variables are gender ideology and cohabitation status. An
index variable was created for gender ideology by combining two questionnaire items,
“WARM” and “ACHIEVE.” These items were worded slightly differently cross the two
waves with different response categories, thus they were standardized before being
combined. The 1995 WARM variable was measured by the question: “A working
mother can establish just as warm and secure relationship with her children as a mother
who does not work.” The ACHIEVE variable was measured by the question: “It is much
better for everyone involved if the man is the achiever outside the home and the woman
takes care of the home and family.” Response categories were coded on a 4-point Likert
scale, ranging from 1 = strongly agree to 4 = strongly disagree. While the 2002 WARM
variable was consistent with that of the 1995 cycle, the ACHIEVE variable, however,
was changed slightly in wording, and was measured by the question: “It is much better
for everyone if the man earns the main living and the woman takes care of the home and
family.” Responses were coded on a 5-point Likert scale, ranging from 1 = strongly
agree to 5 = strongly disagree. After the ACHIEVE variable was reverse-coded in both
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waves, they were standardized and combined with the WARM variable into a new
composite variable with higher mean scores indicating higher gender traditionalism (α =
.55). The cohabitation variable came from several survey items asking respondents’
premarital and post-divorce cohabitation status. These items were recoded into a new
variable with three categories: 1 = cohabitation before 1st marriage, 2 = cohabitation
following divorce, and 3 = no cohabitation. This variable was further dummy-coded with
no cohabitation as the reference category (Xu, Hudspeth and Bartkowski 2006).

Analysis
This study adopted a two-phase analysis approach. In the first phase, bivariate
analysis was conducted to compare remarriage status with a number of independent
variables, including denominational affiliation, religious salience and worship service
attendance. The statistical methods for the bivariate analysis included a cross-tabulation
of denominational affiliation by remarriage status, mean differences of remarriage timing
across denominations, correlation between remarriage timing and religious salience and
attendance, and a two-sample T-test for salience and attendance by remarriage status.
These bivariate analyses yielded exploratory results allowing for a preliminary
examination of remarriage differences across denominations and correlations between
remarriage timing and religious salience and attendance.
The second phase of the analytical approach involved multivariate statistical
analysis, namely, multivariate regression analysis. In order to examine the role of
religion in the propensity and timing of remarriage among divorced women, two
statistical techniques were implemented. First, logistic regression was used to examine
53

the likelihood of remarriage among different religious groups along with religious
salience and worship service attendance. In this case, the dependent variable was
remarriage status based on whether or not the divorced woman has remarried following
divorce. Second, ordinary least squares (OLS) regression was used to examine the length
of waiting time of remarrying following divorce by denominational affiliation, religious
salience and worship service attendance. In both analyses, nested models were developed
and estimated to explore the net effects of denominational affiliation, religious salience,
and worship service attendance on the propensity and timing of remarriage with all
sociodemographic variables controlled for.
Logistic regression is appropriate for the examination of the propensity of
remarriage because the dependent variable (whether the respondent remarried) was
dichotomously coded as 0 for not remarried and 1 for remarried. This technique is
frequently used to model the relationship between a dichotomous dependent variable and
a set of independent variables (Kutner, Nachtsheim and Neter 2004; Powers and Xie
2000). OLS regression is appropriate for the examination of the timing of remarriage
following divorce because the dependent variable (waiting time to remarry following
divorce in century months) satisfies the specific assumptions of this technique. For
example, the dependent variable is continuous and normally distributed (Menard 2001).
Both techniques resulted in a total of five nested models in testing the proposed
research hypotheses. Model 1 was the baseline model that simply enlisted all
sociodemographic control variables, including age at first marriage, age at divorce, race,
number of residential children, education, employment status, total family income,
urban/rural residence and wave of survey (1995 or 2002) to test the effects of these
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variables on the propensity and timing of remarriage. Model 2 featured all
sociodemographic variables included in Model 1 plus denominational affiliation to test
for denominational subcultural variations in the propensity and timing of remarriage
among different faith traditions as well as unaffiliated while controlling for
sociodemographics. With denominational affiliation removed from, Model 3 added
religious salience to test for its independent influence on the propensity and timing of
remarriage controlling for sociodemographics. Similarly, Model 4 removed religious
salience and added worship service attendance to test for its independent effects on the
propensity and timing of remarriage, again with sociodemographics controlled for.
Models 3 and 4 were designed to test the role of religious salience and worship service
attendance as opposed to denominational affiliation. Finally, Model 5, which is the full
model, included all variables allowing for the examination of the propensity and timing
of remarriage across religious denominations while controlling for the religious salience
and worship service attendance variables as listed in Models 3 and 4 and all
sociodemographic variables. This nested and rotating modeling strategy is advantageous
because 1) it tests the independent effects of religious variables individually, and 2) it
tests the non-spurious effects of religious variables collectively and holistically.

55

CHAPTER IV
RESULTS

Once again, data for this study came from two waves of the National Survey of
Family Growth (the 1995 and 2002 cycles). Surveys for the NSFG were based on
personal interviews conducted in the homes of a national sample of women 15-44 years
of age in the civilian, non-institutionalized population of the United States. As
documented previously, two subsamples were tailored for this study. The first
subsample, which is a full sample for this study containing a total of 3,291 divorced
women, was used to explore the propensity of remarriage. The second subsample,
encompassing 1,915 divorced women who were remarried at the time of study, was
employed to examine the timing of remarriage. The results derived from various
statistical analyses are highlighted and reported below.

Descriptive Analysis
Descriptive statistics for all variables in the study are featured in Table 1. The
analysis of the full sample containing both remarried (58.2%) and unremarried (41.8%)
respondents show that the average age of first marriage among American women is 20.4
years and the average age of divorce is 25.6 years. Blacks represent 17% of the full
sample, Hispanics represent 13.6%, whereas other races and ethnicities represent only
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2.8%, with the rest of the sample being white. The average number of resident
children is 1.3. The average educational attainment of the sampled respondents is one
year of college or less. Other socioeconomic status variables reveal that 74% of the
respondents are employed with an average income between $20,000 and $25,000 (from
the untransformed income variable). Moreover, descriptive analysis of denominational
affiliation shows that, of the 3,291 remarried and unremarried respondents, 24.7% are
Catholic, 30.7% are conservative Protestant, and16.2% are Mainline Protestants. In
addition, 10.7% of the respondents reportedly belong to other unspecified Protestant
affiliations, 5.1% belong to other faith traditions, and 12.6% are not affiliated with any
organized religion. Finally the mean values (2.4 and 2.7 respectively) displayed in the
table suggest that the respondents, on average, deem their religion important in their life
and attend worship service quite regularly.
Descriptive analysis was also conducted for the remarried subsample. Results
show that the average waiting time to remarriage following divorce for this subsample is
73.8 century months (more than 6 years), which appears to be longer than the duration
reported by the Census Bureau. Results further show that the average age of first
marriage for remarried respondents is 19.7 years and the average age of divorce is 24.1
years, both of which are somewhat younger than that of the full sample. Consistent with
the full sample, blacks represent 11.5% of the subsample, Hispanics represent 13.2% and
other races and ethnicities represent 2.2%, with the majority of the subsample being
white. Corresponding to the full sample, the average number of resident children for
remarried respondents is 1.4. Educational attainment statistics show that most remarried
respondents have received a high school diploma. The other two socioeconomic status
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variables reveal that 71.5% of the respondents are employed with an average income
between $25,000 and $30,000. The analysis further shows that among the 1,915
remarried respondents, 24.2% are Catholic, 30.9% are conservative Protestant, 18.2% are
Mainline Protestants, 11.1% belong to other unspecified Protestant affiliations, 4.5%
belong to other religions, and 11.1% do not belong to any organized religion. Similar to
the full sample, the respondents included in this subsample, on average, deem their
religion important in their life and attend worship service quite regularly (2.4 and 2.7
respectively).

Bivariate Analysis
Table 2 features bivariate analysis, which contains a cross-tabulation of
denominational affiliation by remarriage status. Results show that 51% of non-affiliates
have remarried. By comparison, 57% of Catholics, 58% of conservative Protestants, 65%
of mainline Protestants, 60% of other Protestants and 52% of the respondents in the other
religious faith traditions have remarried. The chi-squared statistic is statistically
significant at the .000 level, suggesting that women who are affiliated with Christian
denominations are more likely to remarry following divorce than their unaffiliated
counterparts.
Table 3 depicts two-sample T-tests for religious salience and worship service
attendance by remarriage status. Results of religious salience show that the mean values
for unremarried and remarried respondents are 2.38 and 2.43, respectively. Results of
worship service attendance show that the mean frequencies for unremarried and
remarried respondents are 2.62 and 2.69, respectively. While the former mean difference
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is statistically significant, the latter is statistically insignificant. The implications are
twofold. On the one hand, women who deem their religion important in their life on a
continuum are more likely to remarry following divorce than their counterparts who view
religion less important; on the other hand, the frequency of worship service attendance
does not seem to matter, statistically speaking, in the propensity of remarriage.
Table 4 displays the mean differences of remarriage timing across religious
denominations through the analysis of variance. Recall that remarriage timing is
measured in century months (year of divorce * 12 + month). As such, a higher mean
indicates a longer waiting time until remarriage following divorce. Results show that
non-affiliates and Catholics have the highest means of 78.2 and 79.2, respectively.
Conservative Protestants, mainline Protestants and other Protestants, on the other hand,
have the means of 71.98, 67.38 and 75.02, respectively. Additionally, those in the other
faith traditions have a mean of 68.74. Taken together, the analysis of variance suggests
that women who are mainline Protestant, belong to other faith traditions, and are
affiliated with conservative Protestant and other Protestant denominations remarry sooner
than their non-affiliated and Catholic counterparts (the analysis is statistically significant
at least at the .001 level).
Turning to Table 5, which contains correlations between remarriage timing and
religious salience and worship service attendance, it can be noted that there are negative
correlations between both remarriage timing and religious salience and remarriage timing
and worship service attendance. However, both negative correlations are statistically
insignificant.
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Multivariate Analysis
The second phase involves two types of regression analyses. First, logistic
regression was used to examine the propensity of remarriage among different religious
groups, controlling for all sociodemographic variables. Additionally, the dichotomous
remarriage status variable (1 = remarried, 0 = unremarried) was regressed on religious
salience and worship service attendance separately, again controlling for all
sociodemographic variables. A total of five models were estimated and shown in Table
6. Model 1 is the baseline model with all socioldemographic variables included.
Denominational affiliation, religious salience and worship service attendance were added
sequentially and separately into the baseline model, which gave rise to Models 2-4.
Model 5 is the full model containing all variables.
Regression results displayed in Model 1 show that for each additional year of age
at first marriage, the odds of remarrying for the respondent decrease by 2.7%, and for
each additional year of age at divorce, the odds of remarrying decrease by 11.2%. On the
other hand, for each additional resident child, the odds of being remarried increase by
19%. Race variables show that the odds for black and Hispanic respondents to be
remarried are 55.4% and 34.5% lower than that for whites, respectively. The odds for
other races and ethnicities are 42% lower than for whites. Results also show that if the
respondent is employed, the odds of being remarried are 52.6% lower as compared to
those who are unemployed. The regression coefficient for the income variable shows that
for each unit increase in total family income, the odds of being remarried increase by
22.8%. Conversely, for each unit increase in education, the odds of being remarried
decrease by 4.9%. The gender ideology index indicates that for each unit increase in
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gender traditionalism, the odds of remarrying increase by 28.7%. In terms of
cohabitation, the result shows that if the respondent cohabited following divorce, the odds
of remarrying are 137.8% higher than those who have never cohabited.
While the same control variables remain statistically significant as shown in
Model 1 of Table 6, excluding age at first marriage, Model 2 contains the five dummycoded denominational affiliation variables, with non-affiliates as the reference category.
The regression coefficient shows that holding all other variables constant, when
compared to those respondents who are unaffiliated, being a Catholic increases the odds
of remarrying by 43.8%. Again, holding all other variables constant, being a
conservative Protestant increases the odds of remarrying by 123% as compared to being
an unaffiliate. Likewise, the odds of remarrying for mainline Protestants and other
Protestants are 102.2% and 73.8% higher, respectively, than that for non-affiliates, net of
the control variables. Similarly, the odds of remarrying for women who belong to other
faith traditions are 61.8% higher than that of those who are unaffiliated. Given the
findings that closely correspond to the bivariate results shown in Table 2, Hypotheses 2ad and 3 are partially supported.
With the same significant control variables as shown in Model 1, Model 3
contains a religious salience variable to test the effect of the importance of religion on
propensity of remarriage. The result shows that, holding all other variables constant, for
each unit increase in religious salience, the odds of remarrying increase by 43%. This
finding is consistent with the result stemming from the bivariate analysis reported in
Table 3. Thus, Hypothesis 4 is partially supported.
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Model 4 contains the same significant control variables as shown in Models 1 and
3. As featured in Model 4, with regard to worship service attendance, the regression
result shows that for each unit increase in worship service attendance, the odds of
remarrying increase by 24.1%, holding all other variables constant. It turns out that this
multivariate finding is inconsistent with that of the bivariate analysis reported in Table 3
where the result is not statistically significant. Nevertheless, given this regression result,
it can be stated with a high level of confidence that Hypothesis 5 is partially supported.
Model 5 features all variables. With the same significant control variables as
shown in Model 2, Model 5 contains the five dummy-coded religious affiliation
variables. With the exception of other Protestants and Catholics, the results are
comparable to those reported in Model 1 of Table 6. That is, holding all other variables
constant, the odds of remarrying are significantly greater for conservative and mainline
Protestants, and those of other religious faiths. This finding clearly lends credence to
Hypotheses 1 and 3, which predicted that religious subcultural variations are nonspurious and robust after all other religious variables and sociodemographic variables are
controlled for with reference to remarriage propensity.
An auxiliary post-estimation test2 (results not shown) further supports this
denominational subcultural variation thesis in the propensity of remarriage. For example,

2

The parameter estimates for denominational affiliation variables were
tested in STATA in order to examine significant differences among all
possible denominational groups, including those who are unaffiliated.
To consider the robustness of the regression coefficients, the tests were
conducted for the full regression model only, namely, Model 5.
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as surmised, results show that Catholics are significantly less likely than both
conservative and mainline Protestants to remarry.
Additionally, Model 5 included both religious salience and worship service
attendance. Results show that holding all other variables constant, for each unit increase
in religious salience, the odds of remarrying increase by 15.3%. In a similar fashion, for
each unit increase in worship service attendance, the odds of remarrying increase by
15.3%. As a result, all of the research hypotheses articulated previously regarding the
propensity of remarriage are partially supported3.
Second, ordinary least squares (OLS) regression was undertaken to examine the
timing of remarriage following divorce among different religious groups, controlling for
all sociodemographic variables. Additionally, as with propensity, the timing of
remarriage was regressed on religious salience and worship service attendance, again
controlling for all sociodemographic variables. It must be noted that the dependent
variable in the second set of regression analyses is waiting time to remarriage (measured
in century months) for remarried respondents only. Once again, a total of five models
were estimated and the results are reported in Table 6. Within the table, Model 1 is the
baseline mode containing all socioldemographic variables. Denominational affiliation,
religious salience and worship service attendance were added sequentially and separately

3

An estimation for the propensity of remarriage was done with an
alternative model that included denomination with religious salience
and worship service attendance respectively, including all
sociodemographic variables. The results were consistent with those
from Model 5, which included all variables.
63

to the baseline model, which resulted in Models 2-4. Model 5 is the full model
containing all variables.
Model 1 generated an R-squared statistic of .285, indicating that 28.5% of the
observed variance in remarriage timing is explained by all the sociodemographic
variables. Results show that net of other control variables, for each additional year in age
at divorce, the estimated length of waiting time between divorce and remarriage increases
by 2.173 century months. On the other hand, for each additional year in age at first
marriage, the estimated length of waiting time between divorce and remarriage decreases
by 3.797 century months, controlling for other variables. The results for race variables
indicate that the mean waiting time to remarriage for blacks and Hispanics is 21.343 and
13.451 century months longer, respectively, than that of whites. Results also indicate that
for each additional child in the home, the estimated waiting time to remarriage decreases
by 5.86 century months. In terms of cohabitation, results show that if the respondent
cohabitated before first marriage, the estimated waiting time to remarriage is 5.423
century months longer than that of those respondents who have not cohabited. Likewise,
respondents who have cohabited following divorce wait, on average, 8.309 century
months longer to remarry than those who have not cohabited.
The R-squared statistic of .291 in Model 2 suggests that 29.1% of the observed
variance in remarriage timing is explained by the model, slightly higher than Model 1.
While all of the same control variables remain statistically significant as shown in Model
1, with the exception of premarital cohabitation, Model 2 contains five dummy-coded
denominational affiliation variables, with non-affiliate as the reference category. Holding
all other variables constant, results show that conservative and other Protestants are
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negatively and significantly different from non-affiliates regarding remarriage timing.
More specifically, the estimated waiting time to remarriage for conservative Protestants is
7.942 century months less than that of non-affiliates. Likewise, the mean waiting time to
remarriage for other Protestants is 7.582 century months less than that of non-affiliates.
Thus, Hypotheses 2a-d are partially supported with regard to remarriage timing.
The R-squared value of .285 in Model 3 suggests that 28.5% of the observed
variance in remarriage timing is explained by the independent variables. In addition to
the same set of significant control variables shown in Model 1, Model 3 contains a
religious salience variable to test the effect of the importance of religion on the timing of
remarriage. Results show that, holding all other variables constant, religious salience did
not significantly predict remarriage timing. Therefore, Hypothesis 4 is partially rejected.
Comparable to Model 3, the R-squared value of .286 in Model 4 suggests that
28.6% of the observed variance in remarriage timing is explained by the model. Once
again, with the same set of control variables that are statistically significant as shown in
Model 1, Model 4 contains a worship service attendance variable to test its effect on
remarriage timing. As can be seen, holding all other variables constant, worship service
attendance did not significantly predict remarriage timing. Thus, Hypothesis 5 is
partially rejected.
Finally, Model 5 features all variables. The R-squared statistic of .291 suggests
that 29.1% of the observed variance in remarriage timing is explained by the model,
which is slightly better than Model 1. With the same significant controls variables,
Model 5 also contains the five dummy-coded denominational affiliation variables, with
non-affiliate as the reference category. The parameter estimates suggest that holding all
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other variables constant, conservative Protestants remain significantly different from nonaffiliates regarding remarriage timing. That is, the estimated waiting time to remarriage
for conservative Protestants is 7.898 century months less than that of non-affiliates. An
auxiliary post-estimation test (results not shown) shows additional denominational
subcultural variations in the timing of remarriage following divorce. More specifically,
the post-estimation test demonstrates that on average Catholics wait significantly longer
than conservative, mainline and other Protestants to remarry. As a result, Hypotheses 2ad are partially supported.
In addition to denominational affiliation, Model 5 included both religious salience
and worship service attendance variables to test their effects on remarriage timing.
Results show that, holding all other variables constant, neither religious salience nor
worship service attendance has a significant effect on remarriage timing. Hence,
Hypotheses 4 and 5 are partially rejected4.

4

An estimation for the timing of remarriage was done with an
alternative model that included denomination with religious salience
and worship service attendance respectively, including all
sociodemographic variables. The results were consistent with those
from Model 5, which included all variables.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION

Denominational subcultural variations in the propensity and timing of remarriage
have been, by and large, overlooked in the sociological literature to date. This is
surprising for two important reasons. First, religion remains an important and dominant
force in this country, and its impact on the attitudes and behaviors of people is
paramount. Second, of equal importance is the continual rise of divorce and remarriage
rates in America over the last several decades. Given the prevalence of both phenomena,
it is imperative that scholars recognize and adequately measure their impact on one
another. This study is first and systematic attempt to understand the role of religion in
the propensity and timing of remarriage. It is also an attempt to better understand what
has recently been an openly debated topic in the sociological literature, namely, the
current state of the marriage and family in the United States.
The results from this study show that, as hypothesized, there are significant
denominational subcultural variations in the propensity of remarriage among divorce
women in the U.S. Not only are there significant and persistent religious subcultural
variations when all sociodemographic variables are taken into account, there are also
significant relationships between the propensity of remarriage and religious salience and
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worship service attendance. These variations and relationships are remarkably robust and
non-spurious.
More specifically, the results reveal that each of the religion categories including
Catholics, conservative Protestants, mainline Protestants, other Protestants and other faith
traditions, differ in significant ways in their likelihood to remarry following divorce when
they are compared to their non-affiliate counterparts. As hypothesized, each of these
groups is significantly more likely to remarry than those who are unaffiliated with
organized religion. Interestingly, the auxiliary tests provided further support for my
hypotheses regarding denominational subcultural variations in the propensity of
remarriage. These ancillary analyses indicate that Catholics are significantly less likely
to remarry than conservative and mainline Protestants. This is most likely due to the high
cost of divorce and remarriage among the Catholic tradition. The Catholic Church
prohibits second marriages without an annulment. The church also forbids remarried
Catholics without annulments from receiving Communion or sacraments (Hornik 2001).
Taken together, the findings uncovered in this part of analysis suggest that not only are
there differences between religious and non-religious respondents, there are also
variations among women who have diverse religious backgrounds.
With reference to religious salience and worship service attendance, the
significant findings are also worthy of discussion. In general, it can be unequivocally
concluded that as American women’s religious salience and worship service attendance
increase, so does their propensity of remarrying following divorce. This finding is not
surprising because women who deem their religion important and who actively cultivate
their religious networks by frequently partaking in religious services that are likely to
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reinforce their pro-family and pro-nuptial ideologies will adhere most closely to their
theological beliefs, religious values and norms. Consequently, they will not only
consider remarrying after divorce but also do so to put their faith in practice.
In short, results concerning the propensity of remarriage from this study are
consistent with the previous literature suggesting that denominations that place a greater
emphasis on the marriage state are likely to exhibit higher propensity of remarriage. This
statement is further supported by the evidence of the increased propensity of remarriage
among American women who feel that religion is important in their life and who attend
religious services frequently. Thus, it can be concluded without doubt that
denominational subcultural variations in remarriage propensity are supportive of
Christian Smith’s religious subcultural identity theory. Indeed, it seems that, as Smith
contends, the distinctive norms and values associated with various religious groups affect
day-to-day activities and behaviors of their adherents. What makes these results more
remarkable is the mounting evidence that supports the Protestant’s notion of “redemptive
remarriage” rather than the rhetoric of “adulterous remarriage.” In this sense, the
findings derived from this portion of analysis also endorse and underscore Christian
Smith’s thesis of religious engagement, meaning that religious organizations actively
engage their adherents in and negotiate with the modern world by providing meanings
and adaptations to rapid social changes for their members. Thus, remarriage as part of
the life course revolution has been recognized and even encouraged by various Protestant
denominations, particularly, conservative and mainline Protestant denominations.
However, it is important to mention that most of the variations within the Protestant
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denominations are due to the extensive variations within the conservative Protestant
groups (Smith 1998).
Contrary to my hypotheses, however, the results for remarriage timing yielded
unsystematic findings. For example, though there are significant differences in the
timing of remarriage between conservative Protestants and religious nones controlling for
all sociodemographic variables, no additional denominational subcultural variations, as
surmised, surfaced among the remaining groups. Only through auxiliary tests, however,
do we find some support for the denominational subcultural variation thesis. That is, as
hypothesized, conservative, mainline and other Protestants tend to remarry significantly
earlier than Catholics. Nonetheless, these differences can be attributed to increased
acceptance of remarriage among some Protestant denominations and the high cost of
divorce associated with the Catholic faith tradition. Consistent with prior literature,
divorced Catholics appear to be hesitant in remarrying, thus taking longer to choose a
remarriage partner in effort to avoid another divorce. Again, this is not surprising given
the high cost of divorce and remarriage characteristic of the Catholic doctrine.
Religious salience and worship service attendance were analyzed as well to test
their effects on remarriage timing. Surprisingly, with all sociodemographic factors taken
into account, religious salience (measured by how important religion is to the respondent)
and worship service attendance (measured by how frequently the respondent attends
religious services) did not appear to have any significant effects on the timing of
remarriage. As a result, my hypotheses regarding remarriage timing and religious
salience and worship service attendance must be uniformly rejected.
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In sum, as seen above, (1) conservative Protestants remarried significantly earlier
than non-affiliates, and (2) conservative, mainline and other Protestants remarried
significantly earlier than Catholics. Though these limited denominational subcultural
variations in remarriage timing are in concert with those found in remarriage propensity,
they are not as robust and pervasive. Also, in contrast with remarriage propensity,
religious salience and worship service attendance did not significantly predict remarriage
timing. While these findings in remarriage timing partially support the denominational
subcultural variation thesis (e.g., on average, conservative and other Protestants remarry
sooner than various groups), they beg two critical questions. First, why is the
relationship between religious salience and attendance and remarriage timing nonexistent (statistically), whereas it is exceptionally strong and persistent in the case of
remarriage propensity? One speculation is that irrespective of women’s self appraisal of
the importance of religion and their frequency of worship service attendance, they are
equally cautious about entering the second marital union to avoid both religious and
social sanctions against another divorce. Secondly, why are denominational subcultural
variations in remarriage timing substantially less permissible and pronounced than that of
the timing of first marriage? It seems plausible to argue that since the timing of first
marriage is more intimately related to childbearing schedule than is the timing of
remarriage and, since many religious groups are highly pro-prenatal, it is therefore more
essential for women, especially religious women, to consider the timing of first marriage
as compared to remarriage.
Once again, it can be reiterated that while the findings regarding the propensity of
remarriage overwhelmingly support all of the research hypotheses, the findings with
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regard to remarriage timing do so only to a limited extent, suggesting that the
denominational subcultural variations in the timing of first marriage, as found in previous
research (Xu, Hudspeth and Bartkowski 2005), are not as pronounced as we first
surmised in the timing of remarriage. Additionally, whereas the effects of religious
salience and worship service attendance on the propensity of remarriage were
exceptionally robust, thus supporting the research hypotheses, they failed to achieve the
acceptable significance levels in predicting the timing of remarriage. Consequently, the
hypotheses concerning remarriage timing are rejected.
Of the control variables included in the study of remarriage propensity, age at
divorce, race, number of resident children, employment, income, gender ideology, and
cohabitation status were found to be significant predictors. Though education was not
significant in the full model, it is not unexpected for remarriage. Since most women
might have finished their education by the time of divorce and remarriage, educational
attainment will exert its influence on first marriage (i.e., to delay first marriage) but not
on remarriage. In terms of gender ideology, it has been shown that women with more
conservative or traditional gender ideologies tend to place a greater emphasis on the
marriage state and childbearing, which would increase the propensity of remarriage in the
wake of divorce. The findings uncovered here are consistent with this argument. Prior
research suggests that gender traditionalism is most likely to be associated with the
teachings of more conservative religious denominations. As far as cohabitation status is
concerned, the results show that if a woman cohabits before first marriage, the odds for
her to remarry will increase (in the full model). This finding is puzzling because it is the
post-divorce cohabitation (in all models except the full model), not premarital
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cohabitation that can serve as a steppingstone leading to remarriage. Obviously, future
research is needed to unravel this unexpected relationship.
Results were somewhat mixed for the second part of the analysis. Many of the
variables thought to be the most influential, based on previous literature, failed to exhibit
the expected significant effects. Variables such as education, employment status, total
family income, rural/urban residence, and gender ideology were not predictive of
remarriage timing for the subsample of remarried American women. However, age at
first marriage, age at divorce, race, and number of resident children did show significant
effects on the timing of remarriage. Consonant with the literature on the timing of first
marriage, post-divorce cohabitation does delay remarriage, despite the fact that postdivorce cohabitation fosters the likelihood of remarriage.
As noted, conservative Protestants are significantly more likely to remarry and
remarry significantly earlier than other religious groups. Several mechanisms may be at
work here. One explanation may be that these groups tend to have more conservative
theologies than other groups. Therefore, their beliefs, values and norms regarding
divorce and remarriage as well as other issues tend to be more traditional. The data used
for this study, however, did not include a measure of theological belief. These traditional
ideologies, as previous research has suggested, also reach over into other areas, which
may affect the propensity and timing of remarriage. Research has shown that women
within conservative Protestant groups are less likely to pursue education and careers,
which may discourage or delay remarriage. Women within conservative Protestant
denominations begin having children earlier and have more children than women within
some other religious groups. Therefore, women may feel pressure to remarry if they are
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faced with the responsibility of raising small children alone. Additionally, if these
women divorce before they have children, they may pursue remarriage in order to do so.
Several limitations to this study should be acknowledged. First, the two cycles of
the NSFG used in this study do not allow for the examination of the reciprocal
relationship between religion and remarriage as noted by previous research (Thornton et
al. 1992). Therefore, future research should consider using panel design to collect
longitudinal data from respondents to tease out possible causal relationships between
religion and remarriage.
Second, the tailored subsamples of the NSFG utilized in this study contained only
female respondents, thus restricting the generalization of the research findings.
Furthermore, since previous research has shown that females tend to be more religious
than males (Peek, Lowe, and Williams 1991), future research should consider analyzing
the relationship between religion and remarriage for American men. This, however, may
be an advantage and not a limitation if we consider statistics that indicate that women are
more likely than men to initiate divorce. The National Center for Health Statistics reports
that from 1975 to 1988, in families with children present, wives file for divorce in
approximately two-thirds of the cases each year. In 1975, 71.4% of the cases were filed
by women, and in 1988, 65% were filed by women. Likewise, according to Sayer,
England and Allison (2005), NSFH as well as other data, whether qualitative interviews
or fixed response survey questions, indicate that women initiate the majority of divorces.
Evidence shows, “60-70% of U.S. filings have been by women throughout the last
century. There is variation by state, but women predominate in every state” (Sayer et al.
2005: 5).
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Third, as noted previously, the diversity of denominational affiliation is limited.
Despite the fact that the effort was made to use the pooled NSFG data to augment the
sample size, the tailored subsamples are still modest in size. As a result, several distinct
denominations are either underrepresented or not included at all in the data. Future
research should make use of more refined and separate denominational categories, such
as Mormon and Jewish faith traditions, as well as African American Protestants.
Additionally, as discussed in previous literature, variations within conservative
Protestantism may exit. As such, it might be useful and insightful to further break down
the broad conservative and mainline Protestant groups.
Fourth, it is important to include measures of biblical inerrancy or literalism in
future studies. Although this study has documented that some Christian denominations
take a more literal interpretation of the Bible than others, no direct measures of biblical
literalism are available in the data. To remedy this limitation, the current study used
denominational affiliation to approximate distinct values and norms associated with
various religious groups.
Another limitation is possible selection bias due to the age truncation problem
derived from the National Survey of Family Growth. This limitation has two different
connotations. First, the subsamples of divorced women aged 15-44 included in this study
could bias the regression parameter estimates (also known as selection bias). It is so
because older divorced women who were excluded from the study may have different
religious backgrounds and characteristics, such as being more religious and/or more
traditional. If this is indeed the case, then the parameter estimates for the religious
variables will be underestimated.
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Second, the presence of adult children may exert important influences on the
propensity and timing of remarriage. However, the role of adult children in the
propensity and timing of remarriage is not entirely clear. It is possible that they may
interfere with women’s decision to remarry and it is also possible that they may serve as
an incentive to remarriage. Past discussions of remarriage trends have primarily focused
on how a parent’s remarriage affects young children and does not consider what effects
this transition may have on adult children.
According to some researchers, it is possible that adult children serve as a barrier
to remarriage. “Adults can also have trouble coping when a parent takes a new partner,
whether it’s following death or divorce. ‘The impact of a parent’s remarriage on adult
children tends to be overlooked.’ The parent-child bond is intensely strong and a parent’s
remarriage causes a shift in that relationship, which many adult children find unnerving”
(http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,441200,00.html?iid=chix-sphere).
Other evidence suggests that adult children may serve as an incentive to
remarriage. Estimates suggest that about 11% of women will have their first marriages
end in divorce some time after their 40th birthday
(http://www.stepfamilies.info/research/finding7.php). It has been suggested that older
women may not feel the same pressure, financially or otherwise, to remarry when they do
not have young children in the home. More recently, however, it has been suggested that
this trend is not relegated to only those women with young children. College has become
a very common event in the lives of young adults and research suggests that many older
women may lack the “education, skills, and employment experiences” that would allow
them to assist their young adult children with college expenses. Evidence suggests that
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parents continue to contribute financially to their adult children in other ways as well
(e.g. the down payment for a home)
(http://www.stepfamilies.info/research/finding7.php). As a result, the financial burdens
associated with having adult children may increase the pressure to remarry. Therefore,
because of the possible influences adult children may exert on a parent’s decision to
remarry, future study should encompass respondents with a fuller age range.
Finally, when exploring denominational subcultural variations in remarriage
timing, it is desirable to consider the effects of religious homogamy in denominational
affiliation, religious salience, and worship service attendance between the respondent and
the respondent’s spouse. This approach has been fruitful in previous research on the
relationship between religion and early childhood development, and the association
between religion and domestic violence, just name a few (Bartkowski, Xu, and Levin
forthcoming; Ellison, Bartkoski, Anderson 1999). Unfortunately, relevant information is
unavailable in the NSFG but future research should make efforts to collect such
information from the respondent. However, until new research is undertaken, the present
study will remain a catalyst for investigating the relationship between religion and
remarriage in contemporary American society.
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of Full and Subsamples
________________________________________________________________________________________________
Full Sample

Remarried Subsample

%

n

Mean

Remarried

58.2

1,915

--

--

--

--

Unremarried
Length of Waiting Time (Remarried)
Age at 1st Marriage
Age at 1st Divorce
Black
Hispanic
Other Race
White
Number of Resident Children
Unemployed
Employed
Total Family Income
Education
Non Metro Residence
Metro Residence
Gender Ideology
Premarital Cohabitation
Post-divorce Cohabitation
No Cohabitation
1995 wave
2002 wave
Catholic
Conservative Protestant
Mainline Protestant
Other Protestant (Unspecified)
Other Faith Traditions
No Religious Affiliation
Religious Salience
Religious Attendance

41.8
---17.1
13.6
2.8
66.50
-25.6
74.4
--61.9
38.1
-40.7
33.8
25.5
62.7
37.3
24.7
30.7
16.2
10.7
5.1
12.6
---

1,376
---564
447
92
2,188
-842
2,449
--2,036
1,255
-1,338
1,111
842
2,063
1,228
812
1,010
534
353
167
415
---

--20.430
25.550
---

--3.670
5.471
---

-1.300
--9.660
13.060
--0.033
-----------2.409
2.666

-1.165
--4.134
2.491
--0.848
-----------0.709
1.332

----11.5
13.2
2.2
73.1
-28.5
71.5
--64
36
-35.4
44.3
20.3
64.9
35.1
24.2
30.9
18.2
11.1
4.5
11.1
---

----220
252
43
1,400
-546
1,369
--1,226
689
-677
849
389
1,243
672
463
592
348
213
87
212
---

--

3,291

--

--

--

1,915

N
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SD

%

n

Mean

SD

--

--

--73.784 55.200
19.650 3.127
24.050 4.730
-----1.390
--10.623
12.890
--0.088
-----------2.430
2.699

-1.180
--3.929
2.396
--0.850
-----------0.685
1.339

--

--

Table 2. Cross-tabulation of Denomination by Remarriage Status
Current Denomination

Unremarried
Remarried

Total

None
203
48.9%
212
51.1%
415
100.0%

Catholic
349
43.0%
463
57.0%
812
100.0%

Other Faith
Tradition
80
47.9%
87
52.1%
167
100.0%

Conservative
Protestant
418
41.4%
592
58.6%
1,010
100.0%

Mainline
Protestant
186
34.8%
348
65.2%
534
100.0%

Other
Protestant
140
39.7%
213
60.3%
353
100.0%

Total
1,376
41.8%
1,915
58.2%
3,291
100.0%

Chi Square = 23.053
Sig. 000

Table 3. Two Samples T-test for Religious Salience and Worship Service Attendance by Remarriage
Status

Religious Salience

Marriage
Status
Unremarried

N
1,376

Mean
2.3801

F
18.90900

Sig.
0.00000

Worship Service Attendance

Remarried
Unremarried

1,915
1,376

2.4298
2.6199

0.85300

0.35600

Remarried

1,915

2.6987
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Table 4. Mean Difference of Remarriage Timing by Denomination
Current Denomination
No Affiliation
Catholic
Other Faith Tradition
Conservative Protestant
Mainline Protestant
Other Protestant
Total
F=4.350
Sig. .001

Mean
78.2311
79.2397
68.7356
71.9882
67.3764
75.0235
73.7843

N
212
463
87
592
348
213
1,915

Std. Deviation
56.92873
56.41303
45.83678
58.66950
48.54315
53.57427
55.19967

Table 5. Correlation between Remarriage Timing and Religious Salience and Correlation
Between Remarriage Timing and Worship Service Attendance
Remarriage
Timing
Pearson Correlation
Remarriage Timing
1
Sig. (2-tailed)
-N
1,915
Pearson Correlation
Religious Salience
-0.018
Sig. (2-tailed)
0.433
N
1,915
Pearson Correlation
Worship Service
-0.018
Attendance
Sig. (2-tailed)
0.443
N
1,915
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
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Religious
Salience
-0.018
0.433
1,915
1
-1,915
.570(**)
0.000
1,915

Worship
Service
Attendance
-0.018
0.443
1,915
.570(**)
0.000
1,915
1
-1,915

Table 6. Unstandardized Coefficients of Logistic Regressions to Predict Propensity of Remarriage (American
Women)

Independent Variable

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Model 5

Age at 1st Marriage
Age at 1st Divorce
Black (Reference White)
Hispanic
Other Race
Number of Resident Children
Employment Status (Reference Unemployed)
Total Family Income

-.027 †
-.119 ***
-.807 ***
-.408 **
-.545 *
.174 ***
-.746 ***
.206 ***

-.025
-.122 ***
-.975 ***
-.305 *
-.529 *
.167 ***
-.767 ***
.208 ***

-.029 †
-.122 ***
-.967 ***
-.462 ***
-.612 *
.166 ***
-.750 ***
.208 ***

-.030 *
-.123 ***
-.987 ***
-.487 ***
-.612 *
.147 ***
-.763 ***
.209 ***

-.027
-.124 ***
-1.105 ***
-.381 †
-.591
.150 ***
-.774 ***
.210 ***

Education
Urbanicity (Reference Rural)
Gender Ideology
Premarital Cohabitation (Reference No Cohab)
Post-divorce Cohabitation
Year of Study (Reference 1995)

-.050 **
-.113
.252 ***
.045
.866 ***
.187 *

-.048 *
-.082
.231 ***
.117
.952 ***
.201 *

-.051 **
-.094
.218 ***
.129
.934 ***
.220 *

-.063 **
-.116
.216 ***
.172
.962 ***
.197 *

-.058
-.086
.203 ***
.197 ***
.991
.220 *

Catholic (Reference None)
Conservative Protestant
Mainline Protestant
Other Protestant (Unspecified)
Other Faith Traditions

------

.363 *
.802 ***
.704 ***
.553 **
.481 *

------

------

.063
.433 *
.395 *
.196
.217 **

Religious Salience
Religious Attendance

---

---

.358 ***
--

-.216 ***

.143 †
.143 **

Constant
-2Loglikelihood Statistic
Chi-Squared

2.904 *** 2.310 ***
2.116 ***
2.644 ***
2.101 ***
3485.607
3449.731
3451.904
3445.657
3424.246
1023.88
988.012 ***
7 *** 1021.714 *** 1027.961 *** 1049.373 ***

df

14

19

15

15

21

N

3,291

3,291

3,291

3,291

3,291

†p<.10
*p<.05
**p<.01
***p<.001
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Table 7. Unstandardized Coefficients of OLS Regressions to Predict Timing of Remarriage
(American Women)

Independent Variable

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Model 5

Age at 1st Marriage
Age at 1st Divorce
Black (Reference White)
Hispanic
Other Race
Number of Resident Children
Employment Status (Reference Unemployed)
Total Family Income

-3.797 ***
2.173 ***
21.343 ***
13.451 ***
9.657
-5.860 ***
-0.928
0.492

-3.924 ***
2.191 ***
23.909 ***
9.719 **
8.584
-5.901 ***
-0.522
0.456

-3.795 ***
2.176 ***
21.896 ***
13.618 ***
9.900
-5.857 ***
-1.034
0.493

-3.781 ***
2.182 ***
22.072 ***
13.727 ***
9.862
-5.738 ***
-0.940
0.499

-3.916 ***
2.193 ***
24.027 ***
9.782 **
8.592
-5.848 ***
-0.492
0.459

Education
Urbanicity (Reference Rural)
Gender Ideology
Premarital Cohabitation (Reference No Cohab)
Post-divorce Cohabitation
Year of Study (Reference 1995)

-0.161
-0.292
-0.159
-0.117
-0.272
3.684
3.516
3.639
3.756
3.562
1.083
1.419
1.200
1.243
1.448
5.423 †
4.484
5.061 †
4.790
4.338
8.309 **
7.385 **
7.990 **
7.832 **
7.286 **
53.697 *** 54.086 *** 53.633 *** 53.678 *** 54.095 ***

Catholic (Reference None)
Conservative Protestant
Mainline Protestant
Other Protestant (Unspecified)
Other Faith Traditions

------

Religious Salience
Religious Attendance

---

Constant
R Squared
N

3.170
-7.942 *
-4.881
-7.582 †
.516
---

------

------

-1.352
--

--0.850

3.187
-7.898 †
-4.882
-7.532
.425
0.455
-0.369

71.482 *** 79.637 *** 74.904 *** 72.717 *** 78.973 ***
0.285 *** 0.291 *** 0.285 *** 0.286 *** 0.291 ***
1,915

†p<.10
*p<.05
**p<.01
***p<.001
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1,915

1,915

1,915

1,915

